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ABSTRACT
Andrew H. Tyner: Complexity, Uncertainty, and the Status Quo
(Under the direction of Timothy J. Ryan)
In three empirical chapters, my dissertation presents the complexity of issue debates as a
product of elite efforts to mobilize and demobilize support for issue reform. The success
of these efforts depends on citizens’ ability to process large volumes of diverse information.
My first chapter uses unsupervised topic modeling of congressional floor speeches to test
predictions from my theory of political elites’ communication strategies. As expected, I
find that supporters of reform keep issue debates simple by focusing on a small number of
arguments, while opponents focus broadly on a wide range of arguments to make debates
complex. They follow this strategy because complexity creates uncertainty. Uncertainty
weakens attitudes, which depresses participation and support for reform. My second chapter
focuses on direct democracy, and looks at one particular way that ballot measures can
become more or less complex: namely, the clarity of their policy goals. I predict that clear
policy goals should make citizens more likely to vote on a ballot measure, more likely to
support reform when the policy goals are shared across the ideological spectrum, and more
likely to vote in alignment with their political predispositions when the policy goals are
associated with the political right or left. I first merge an ANES dataset that includes 81
ballot measures with hand-coded measures of their characteristics. Second, I administer an
original survey experiment that varies the clarity of ballot measures’ goals. My expectations
are supported in both studies. In the third chapter, I return to the causal model outlined
in the first chapter to test the effects of complex debates on the mass public. Using two
original survey experiments, I find that citizens who can process high volumes of political
information gain stronger attitudes from complex debates, while citizens who cannot process
information develop weaker issue attitudes. Taken together, my dissertation demonstrates
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that elites can influence who takes action on political issues through their messaging, and
that they use this capacity to advance their goals.
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Complexity and the Status Quo in Reform Debates:
Congressional Rhetoric on the Affordable Care Act
Political elites compete through their rhetoric to shape the public’s view of proposed
policy reforms, particularly on highly salient issues (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech &
Kimball 2009). Supporters and opponents of reform each make their case to the public, with
supporters hoping to either win approval for reform or at least not invite public resistance.
Opponents hope to disquiet the public enough that supporters get scared off from further
progress and reform efforts stall out. Both sets of elites strategically select arguments to
achieve these outcomes (Riker 1986, Holian 2004, Jerit 2008, Ha¨nggli & Kriesi 2012).
One advantage that opponents of reform have over supporters is the public’s preference
for the status quo. Existing theory has identified a status quo bias in human decision-making
– a bias that exists alongside and rests on people’s aversion to risk and uncertainty (Eidelman
& Crandall 2009). All else equal, status quo arrangements seem less risky and more certain
in people’s minds than reform, which means that reform proposals need to clear an extra
hurdle relative to the status quo to achieve widespread support: they need to advance a
worthy goal while also posing a minimal risk in people’s minds.
I propose that supporters and opponents each account for status quo bias in their rhetor-
ical strategies, with supporters seeking to undermine it and opponents seeking to activate
it. They achieve these outcomes through two approaches. First, I claim that opponents
and supporters can put relatively more or less emphasis on losses in their arguments, since
loss heightens the sense of risk associated with reform. Second, they can manipulate the
complexity of the debate, where complexity is defined by how many distinct arguments are
raised in discussions of the issue. Complex discussions activate status quo bias by making
issue reform seem risky and uncertain. Simple discussions, by contrast, undermine status
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quo bias by focusing people’s attention on only a few aspects of reform. Further, these as-
pects are often highly agreeable. Thus, even beyond the individual frames that elites select
to bolster their side, elites’ goals should shape the overall structure of the debate.
In this paper, I test the hypothesis that supporters and opponents of reform pursue differ-
ent rhetorical strategies in issue reform debates. Supporters keep debates simple by focusing
narrowly on a small set of arguments, while opponents make debates complex by spreading
their attention widely across more arguments. Further, supporters focus more attention on
gains relative to losses, and opponents take the opposite approach.
I find support for these expectations by topic modeling speeches on health care reform
delivered by members of the House of Representatives between February 2009 and the end of
March 2010. This procedure allows me to identify each of the main arguments about reform
that were raised over the course of the debate. I find that Democrats – who were supporters
of reform in this debate – spread their attention across comparatively fewer arguments than
Republicans, who were opponents of reform. Furthermore, Democrats emphasized potential
gains while Republicans stressed potential losses, as predicted. Thus, in this paper I show
that elites’ goals influence both the content and the structure of issue debates.
Status Quo Bias and Resistance to Reform
I categorize political elites into two groups. Supporters of reform seek to change the
policy status quo. Opponents of reform seek to maintain policy as it is. Each pursues a
distinct rhetorical strategy in issue reform debates.
Opponents of reform aim to build on status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler
1991, Eidelman & Crandall 2012). Status quo bias refers to features of human psychology
that push people to favor the status quo. These include people’s preference for precedent,
the tendency for people to like objects more the longer they are exposed to them, and the
perception of people seeking reform as overly extreme and unreasonable (Eidelman, Crandall
& Pattershall 2009, Eidelman, Pattershall & Crandall 2010, Eidelman & Crandall 2009). Bias
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in favor of the status quo has been used to explain the challenges of achieving reform on
both policy and procedural matters (Zink & Dawes 2015, MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman &
Keele 2007).
Extensive research also demonstrates that most people hold an aversion to risks and
potential losses (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Risk aversion affects many aspects of people’s
lives, including their political behavior. Individuals who are risk-averse are less supportive of
challengers than incumbents in elections and demonstrate lower support for policy reforms
that are perceived to be risky (Eckles, Kam, Maestas & Schaffner 2014, Kam & Simas 2012,
Ehrlich & Maestas 2010, Eckles & Schaffner 2011).
Risk and loss aversion complement the status quo bias discussed above and help support
it. Potential losses that follow reform loom larger than potential gains, reinforcing the
dangers that attend altering the status quo (Arceneaux 2012). Thus, reform efforts that
seem risky will face an uphill battle in gaining public support. As such, status quo bias and
the risk aversion that underlies it represent some of the strongest tools opponents of reform
have to undermine policy reform efforts.
Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Fostering uncertainty about the consequences of reform is an effective way to activate
both risk aversion and status quo bias. When the consequences of reform are in doubt,
potential losses are more likely to outweigh potential gains. The known is preferable to the
unknown, such that certain problems with the status quo can seem less troubling than uncer-
tain risks of change (Fernandez & Rodrik 1991). Feeling uncertain is an aversive experience
for most people, leading them to find ways to resolve uncertainty as efficiently as possible
(Van den Bos et al. 2009). Managing one’s sense of uncertainty is a basic human motive,
and people will take steps to restore confidence in their own judgments and assuage doubts
when such feelings arise (Van den Bos & Lind 2002).
All of this serves as an advantage to the status quo. The status quo is a known quan-
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tity, so even if aspects of it are unfavorable, its continuation does not foster the same
level of uncertainty as reform proposals. Accordingly, risk-averse citizens are more com-
fortable with known outcomes than probabilistic outcomes in political decisions (Kam &
Simas 2010, Ortoleva 2010). Therefore, uncertainty over outcomes should lead citizens to
oppose political reform, even when the status quo is recognized to be a problem.
Status quo bias as discussed here should be distinguished from a more general conserva-
tive bias. Jost and Amodio (2012) review a host of psychological and physiological differences
between liberals and conservatives and note that conservatives display less tolerance for ambi-
guity and uncertainty than liberals, as well as less motivation to attain a cognitively complex
understanding of reality. Acknowledging that ideology itself is a bulwark against feelings of
uncertainty (Jost & Amodio 2012, 55-6), they argue that conservatism is distinguished by
its particular appeal to people who are anxious in the face of uncertainty.
All the same, I propose that uncertainty should activate status quo bias for all citizens,
not just conservatives. It may be that conservatives experience greater uncertainty than
liberals in response to the same stimuli, or that conservatives require less uncertainty to
activate status quo bias. Even so, that uncertainty will lead to status quo bias should be
common to both liberals and conservatives alike. As such, raising uncertainty should serve to
derail reform efforts by making the status quo seem more palatable relative to the proposed
reform than it otherwise would be.
Fostering Uncertainty Through Complexity
Previous work in mass decision-making has focused on the role of specific personality
characteristics – like risk acceptance – and particular frames in activating status quo bias
(Arceneaux 2012, Ehrlich & Maestas 2010, Kam & Simas 2010). By contrast, I offer a
broader account of elites’ capacity to raise uncertainty through their rhetoric. I claim that
elites can foster uncertainty, thereby activating risk aversion and status quo bias, by increas-
ing the complexity of a political debate. Complex political rhetoric that raises the salience
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of many different aspects of a proposal leads to cross-cutting evaluations of the proposal and
an overload of information. Both outcomes should raise people’s uncertainty about reform.
Supporters of reform want to focus on the problems at hand, the solutions that will
directly address the problem, and the goals that will be achieved by implementing that so-
lution (Entman 2007). Opponents of reform want to make issues seem more complex by
following two strategies. First, they spread their attention across a wide range of arguments
by introducing a diverse array of considerations and dimensions of debate. Previous research
has argued that elites will add a dimension to the debate when they are losing support in
an attempt to flip the outcome (Riker 1990). Spreading attention across a wide range of
arguments introduces many more criteria into a decision context, which can cause disengage-
ment from the decision process and a reversion to the status quo (Barker & Hansen 2005).
Further, all attempts to fit a high-dimensional political reality to a low-dimensional deci-
sion context inevitably leave important considerations out of the equation (Jones, Talbert
& Potoski 2003). Reducing dimensions is necessary to limit uncertainty and allow decisions
to be made. By extension, political elites who want to raise uncertainty should attempt to
increase the dimensionality of the issue debate.
As a second way of increasing complexity, elites can focus on the costs, unintended con-
sequences, and the process of political reform itself. Discussing these aspects of reform
activates risk and loss aversion directly by raising considerations about costs and losses. It
also complicates the simplified policy narrative of the reform supporters, in which there is a
clearly identified problem, a solution readily at hand, and lofty goals that will be achieved
by implementing that solution (Entman 2007). Opponents of reform want to infuse the issue
debate with complicating considerations to disrupt this simple narrative.1 Taking attention
away from exclusively problems and goals thus makes the debate more complex.
In addition to supporting or opposing reform, the time period within the debate should
1This prediction expands on Jerit’s (2008) analysis of President Clinton’s failed health care reform efforts.
She also predicts that supporters and opponents of reform should focus on costs and benefits of reform at
different rates, though the substantive focus of our theories remains distinct.
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shape how complex elites make their issue presentations. Opponents of reform should use
more complexity earlier in a debate than later. As the debate wears on and arguments are
used repeatedly across communication platforms, opponents gain a better sense of which
arguments are gaining traction in the media and within the mass public. Opponents should
focus their attention more centrally on the arguments they perceive as most effective in the
later stages of the debate, and the list of talking points should narrow down accordingly.
By contrast, supporters should focus narrowly early in the debate on problems with the
status quo and goals of political reform, resulting in the simple issue presentation discussed
above. Over time, supporters are compelled to respond to the arguments presented by op-
ponents that seem effective. The result is that supporters’ attention has to be spread more
broadly as the debate enters the late stages, as they focus both on the problems and goals
that represent the core of their rhetorical strategy and attempt to counter the most effective
arguments presented by the opponents of reform.
To summarize, political debates are shaped by people’s status quo bias and risk aversion.
Complex rhetoric activates both features of human decision-making. Thus, political elites
in favor of reform should adopt simple rhetorical strategies focused on gains from reform or
losses from inaction. Opponents of reform should adopt complex rhetorical strategies that
employ many distinct arguments and that focus on potential losses from reform, since they
hope to raise uncertainty and, by extension, risk aversion and status quo bias.
Hypotheses
This theory leads to a set of hypotheses about the different rhetorical strategies pursued by
supporters and opponents of reform:
• H1: Opponents of reform should rely on a wider range of arguments in an issue debate
than supporters of reform.
• H2: The range of arguments used by opponents of reform during an issue debate should
decrease over time.
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• H3: The range of arguments used by supporters of reform during an issue debate should
increase over time.
• H4: Supporters of reform should focus more on problems and goals than opponents of
reform.
• H5: Opponents of reform should focus more on costs, unintended consequences, and
the process of political reform itself than supporters of reform.
Design
I test these hypotheses on the rhetoric of members of the U.S. House of Representatives
during the 2009-2010 health care reform debate, which resulted in passage of the Affordable
Care Act in March 2010. This issue debate is well suited to test my hypotheses for three
reasons. First, it was a highly salient debate that dominated coverage for long stretches
of time. Even politically disengaged citizens could be expected to know something about
the issue from the high volume of coverage. While some issue debates might be confined to
a smaller political class, members of Congress were almost certainly tailoring their talking
points to reach the broader mass public. Second, the debate spanned well over a year, which
allows me to test my time-dependent second and third hypotheses. Third, expanding health
care coverage has long been a Democratic policy priority. Its fixture in partisan conflict over
the decades supports my assumption that both sides of the debate had coordinated their
talking points prior to and during the debate.
Relying on the rhetoric of U.S. House members has a number of advantages. First, as
highly visible elites with a range of communication platforms at their disposal, House mem-
bers help set the political agenda for both the media and the mass public (McCombs 2013).
The topics they focus on become the public’s focus. The talking points that members
promote become the pool of arguments that the media and public draw on in their own
discussions of an issue.
Second, members of the House communicate frequently and consistently about topics of
major importance through a variety of communication platforms. This sustained attention
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allows us to see how the rhetoric of political elites changes across time as the debate proceeds
through different stages. Finally, each House member in the data is affiliated with either
the Democratic or the Republican Party. In the context of a major legislative debate, that
affiliation allows us to assign each speaker the status of supporter or opponent of reform.
I rely on House floor speeches in the following analyses. Floor speeches have two advan-
tages over other forms of public rhetoric for hypothesis-testing. First, they are written by
House members themselves (or at least by members of their staff), so they represent their
motivations and intentions in a distilled form. This contrasts with other communication for-
mats like television or radio appearances, where their comments are at least partially shaped
by the questions they receive. Second, floor speeches are long enough documents that the
full range of arguments that a member of Congress wants to use can be included. Because
I want to measure all of the arguments that a member thinks are necessary, it is important
that members are not artificially constrained by the time they are allotted to speak or the
questions they are asked to respond to, both of which apply during media appearances.2
Congressional Text Data
I use text data from the one-minute speeches delivered on the floor of the House of Rep-
resentatives (or printed directly to the Congressional Record) from February 2009 through
March 21, 2010. The speeches were identified through a supervised topic model implemented
by the original collector of the speech data (Hughes 2016). 11,333 of the full set of 43,880
one-minute speeches delivered between 1989 and 2012 were hand-coded according to Baum-
gartner and Jones’ Policy Agendas Project (PAP) major-topic coding scheme and were used
to train the model on which the remaining speeches were classified.
I draw exclusively on the speeches that were classified as belonging to the Health topic
between February 2009 and March 2010. Further, I have attempted to remove speeches with
2Though one-minute speeches do face a time constraint, members of the House often make additions to
the text before they are published in the Congressional Record if there were points they did not have time
to make in the original speech. Thus, I make the assumption that the speech data I analyze fully reflect the
range of arguments each House member wants to use.
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titles that do not correspond to health care reform. A full set of descriptive statistics about
the resulting 1,120 one-minute speeches is contained in Table 1.1. The table demonstrates
that there is a fairly even distribution of speeches across the two parties and that, on average,
speeches are about the length of a long paragraph.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of one-minute floor speeches.
One-Minute Speeches
Number of Documents 1,120
Minimum – Word Count 42
Maximum – Word Count 635
Mean – Word Count 184.30
Standard Deviation – Word Count 37.03
Median – Word Count 183
Percent Democrat 44.91%
The speeches represented in this table are all of the one-minute floor speeches delivered in the U.S. House about health care
reform between February 3, 2009 and March 21, 2010.
Mining Congressional Speech
My definition of complexity requires a method to extract the number of arguments used
by supporters and opponents of reform during an issue debate. I use structural topic models
(STM) to identify the number, character, and representative vocabulary associated with
each side’s topics. Structural topic models are a form of unsupervised topic modeling that
clusters all of the unique topics collectively comprising a corpus of documents, where a
topic is an unobserved theme denoted by a unique vocabulary (Blei 2012). In contrast to
supervised models, unsupervised models do not rely on any pre-determined assumptions
about the topics contained within a corpus. Instead, the categories that comprise a corpus
and the distribution of each constituent document across the topics are all inferred directly
from the data (Roberts, Stewart, Tingley, Lucas, Leder-Luis, Gadarian, Albertson & Rand
2014). The only input required is the number of topics that the model should fit the data
to (Nowlin 2015). Further, structural models are mixed-membership, meaning that each
document is assumed to belong to multiple topics, and the modeling task is to estimate the
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proportion of each document that belongs to each topic in the corpus (Roberts, Stewart &
Airoldi 2016).
The output from fitting the STM is a collection of topics that produced the corpus and a
list of words that have a high probability of being associated with each topic. Each document
in the corpus receives a topic distribution that indicates the proportion of the document
that was produced by each discovered topic (Roberts, Stewart & Airoldi 2016). These
per-document proportions can be used to determine how concentrated or spread out each
document author’s attention is across topics, which I use as a measure of each document’s
complexity. This is discussed in greater detail below.
Testing the fourth and fifth hypotheses requires looking at the content of each topic
instead of simply the distribution of the document across topic memberships. Since no
topic labels are provided to the model at the outset in unsupervised learning, deciphering
the unifying theme of each generated topic happens after model estimation. This process
relies on researcher interpretation of each topic’s vocabulary. To aid the interpretation of
topics, each word in a topic’s vocabulary is assigned a FREX (FRequency-EXclusivity) score
that incorporates a word’s frequency within a topic as well as its exclusivity to that topic.
Since the FREX index incorporates both elements, higher scores indicate that a word is
particularly characteristic of that specific topic (Airoldi & Bischof 2015). The set of each
topic’s words with the highest FREX scores indicate what the topic is about.
Finally, one of the more consequential decisions that the researcher needs to make when
fitting an unsupervised topic model is the number of topics that should be estimated (Blei
2012). This is especially true for the present analysis, where the number of topics that the
speakers can draw from directly impacts how concentrated or diffuse their topic attention
is. As is the case with labeling estimated topics, there are no specific rules to follow when
selecting the number of topics, though in general the number of topics should increase as
the size of the corpus increases (Roberts et al. 2014).
The analyses below rely on a 40-topic model featuring the full unigram text representation
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of one-minute floor speeches delivered between February 3, 2009 – the earliest date that a
speech about health care reform was given in the 111th Congress – and March 21, 2010. I
surveyed a range of text representations and number of topics before determining the 40-
topic unigram representation to be best. My discussion of those procedures is contained in
Appendix 1A. Table 1.2 organizes the 40 estimated topics by underlying idea.
Table 1.2: Estimated Topics by Substantive Similarity
Category Topic Numbers
Status Quo Problems 2, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 33, 36
Goals 5, 7, 11, 14, 24, 26, 27, 40
Process 4, 16, 29
Cuts & Costs 3, 32, 35
Partisanship & Media Coverage 6, 12, 17, 21, 37
Big Government 1, 13, 25, 30
Constituents 31, 39
Small Business 34
Public Option 10
Unsure/Unlabeled 15
Unsure/Unlabeled 38
Goals (non-ACA) 28
Each number corresponds to a topic estimated from the 40-topic structural topic model referenced throughout the Results
section. The groupings in this table represent clusters of similar topics.
I have minimized my manipulation of the floor speeches as much as possible. Three
exceptions should be noted. First, I include only terms that appear at least five times in
the corpus. Excluding terms that rarely appear ensures that idiosyncratic language and
misspellings are not categorized into a topic. Second, I exclude a set of terms that show up
frequently but that have no substantive relevance to political issues generally or health care
specifically. These include the names of all the representatives serving in the 111th Congress
who authored one of the speeches in the data, the name and abbreviation of every state,
and a short list of additional terms.3 Finally, Joe Wilson (R-SC) delivered many speeches
in the dataset and ended each one, regardless of topic, with the same phrase: “God bless
the troops and we will never forget 9/11.” The frequent repetition of this phrase causes it
to show up as a distinct topic in most models, so I have deleted the phrase in the dataset
whenever it appears.
3The additional excluded terms are as follows: re, don, t, doesnt, going, ve, thats, dont, cant, theyre, r,
s, m, mrs, d.
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Dependent Variables
Complexity: Complexity is the main dependent variable of the study, and it is measured
by the distribution of attention across the topics of a speech. I calculate complexity as a
Shannon’s diversity index score. Scores on the index are higher when the elements in a given
unit (i.e. a floor speech) are evenly spread among many categories and lower when elements
are concentrated narrowly into a small number of categories. In the context of the health
care debate, each category is one of the estimated topics and an element is the proportion
of a document about that topic. The formula for the diversity index is as follows, where p
refers to the proportion of a document i devoted to topic j:
H = −
j∑
i=1
(pij ∗ ln(pij))
In a 10-topic model, for example, the index accounts for all ten topics’ proportions. In a
20-topic model, all 20 topics’ proportions are used. The variable is scaled 0-1. Higher values
indicate greater complexity.
Topic Proportion: The proportion of a speech devoted to each of the topics is used
to calculate the measure of complexity described immediately above. It is also a dependent
variable in its own right, since H4 and H5 predict that supporters and opponents of reform
will focus on different topics.
Independent Variables
Party: In the 2009-2010 health care debate, I consider all Democrats to be supporters of
reform and all Republicans to be opponents of reform. Accordingly, I use a dummy variable
indicating the speaker’s political party to measure which side of the debate the speaker
represents. The variable is coded 1 when the speaker is a Democrat and 0 when she is a
Republican.
Days: I include a count of the days since February 3, 2009 to measure time. February 3
is the first day that a floor speech about health care was delivered, and thus it is coded as 0.
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Validating and Clustering Topics
To validate that the topics produced by the unsupervised approach are meaningful, I
plot the correlations among estimated topics below. White nodes represent topics where
Democrats have a higher mean proportion, meaning they spend more time on average on
that topic than Republicans. Grey nodes represent topics where Republicans have the higher
mean. A dotted line connecting two topics means their correlation is above zero at any level
of statistical significance.
Figure 1 plots these correlations. The figure provides evidence that the topics are clus-
tering as expected, thus providing evidence that the STM is detecting meaningful topics.
My theory suggests that supporters and opponents of reform should focus on different topics
(i.e. Democrats should focus more on the goals of reforming health care). If the party of
the speaker can predict topic use in this way, then topics that receive relatively more atten-
tion from Democrats should correlate with one another, and topics that receive relatively
more attention from Republicans should do the same. Figure 1.1 reveals this to be the case.
Further, the correlations among topics make substantive sense, since talking points on the
same topic are correlated. For example, topics 3 and 32 in the upper right corner of the
figure are both about potential cuts to existing programs that might result from the reform
proposal. The topics are correlated, as expected, and both are more frequently discussed by
Republicans than Democrats.
Beyond validating that the topics are correlated, a closer examination of the 40 topics re-
veals that many of them are quite similar. For example, the model produces multiple topics
where the speakers lament the status quo of health care in the United States, with only small
variations in language within each of those topics. Splitting the same ideas among more than
one topic might underestimate the degree of simplicity in Democratic floor speeches, partic-
ularly if Democratic talking points are more likely to be split among multiple topics than
Republican talking points. Further, since H4 and H5 predict different rates of argument use
from supporters and opponents of reform, splitting the same basic argument across multiple
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Figure 1.1: Correlations Among Estimated Topics
Topic 1
Topic 2
Topic 3
Topic 4
Topic 5
Topic 6
Topic 7
Topic 8
Topic 9
Topic 10
Topic 11
Topic 12
Topic 13
Topic 14
Topic 15
Topic 16
Topic 17
Topic 18
Topic 19
Topic 20
Topic 21
Topic 22
Topic 23
Topic 24
Topic 25
Topic 26
Topic 27
Topic 28
Topic 29
Topic 30
Topic 31
Topic 32
Topic 33
Topic 34
Topic 35
Topic 36
Topic 37
Topic 38
Topic 40
The topics displayed in this figure are derived from the 40-topic structural topic model discussed in
the main text. White nodes indicate that Democrats spend more time discussing the topic. Grey
nodes indicate that Republicans spend more time discussing the topic.
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estimated topics prevents a clean hypothesis test.
To address this limitation, the 40 topics produced by the 40-topic model were narrowed
down to 12 topics by combining together similar ideas. The resulting clustered topics are
listed in Table 1.2 above. Categorizing topics like this departs from the data-driven approach
of unsupervised learning, but it is necessary if the number and diversity of argument types
is going to be properly measured. Clustering topics by the underlying argument they are
making brings more substantive expertise to the analysis than a strictly unsupervised mod-
eling approach would allow.
I have made a series of decisions that make the ensuing analyses more conservative against
finding support for my hypotheses. First, I have intentionally been generous in categorizing
Republican talking points together to concentrate their attention: the “costs” topic was com-
bined with two topics on potential cuts that could result from reform. Further, Republican
talking points about biased media coverage were grouped under a more general partisanship
topic.
Given my theoretical focus on status quo bias, I group all topics focused on problems
with the status quo into one category. Differences do emerge among these topics: some
focus on sad stories of struggling constituents, others on the problem of pre-existing health
conditions, and others still on rising premiums. Still, all are united by the theme that the
current system is broken, and I classify them together accordingly. The analyses below all
rely on the 12 clustered topics since the 12 offer more substantive and coherent arguments
in this particular policy debate. For robustness, I have tested H1-3 without clustering in a
variety of configurations and generally found support for them.4
4Specifically, in Appendix 1B I demonstrate that H1 receives support without clustering for topic models
with greater than 20 topics, but not for models with 20 or fewer topics. Further, across most of the topic
models without clustering with 10, 15, 20, 40, 60, and 80 topics, the predicted levels of complexity across
party and time support the expectations in H2 and H3: Democrats become more complex over time, while
Republicans become less complex. Without clustering the topics, these effects are not statistically significant,
but the trend lines provide supporting evidence for the robustness of my findings. Without clustering topics,
it is not possible to test H4 or H5. Thus, I do not test the robustness of H4 and H5 with unclustered topics
in the main text or appendices.
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Results
In the analyses below, I compare the complexity of Democratic and Republican speeches
in two ways. Each test is OLS regression with three covariates: party of the speaker, the
number of days since February 3, 2009 (the first date in the dataset), and an interaction
between the two. The predicted value of the dependent variable is then plotted by party
across the 411 days in the dataset with 95% confidence intervals. Dashed lines and confi-
dence intervals represent Democratic estimates; solid lines and confidence intervals represent
Republican estimates.
Figure 1.2 plots the predicted Shannon’s diversity index scores by party across the time
period of the debate. As discussed above, index scores are highest when each constituent
topic covers an equal proportion of the overall speech. As such, higher index scores for a
speech indicate greater dispersion of attention across topics, meaning greater complexity.
The figure provides supportive evidence for H1: Republican speeches, on average, are more
complex than Democratic speeches. This is particularly the case early in the debate, where
a switch from a Democratic representative to a Republican representative moves the speech
over 16 percentage points up the complexity scale. The gap between the two parties’ speeches
narrows over the course of the debate, as suggested by the sign and near significance at the
0.10 level of party and time’s interaction (p=0.11; see Table 1.3 for more detail). By March
2010, a switch from a Democratic to a Republican speech represents just a 7 percent increase
in the complexity scale. Notably, Figure 1.2 reveals that the complexity gap narrows because
Republican speeches get simpler – not because Democratic speeches become more complex.
This pattern of evidence thus supports H1 and H2, but not H3.
On their own, the Shannon’s diversity index scores are hard to interpret substantively.
To get a better sense of the difference between Democratic and Republican speeches, I plot
in Figure 1.3 the distribution of speeches by the proportion of each speech devoted to its
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own most prevalent topic. Prevalent topics that account for a large portion of the speech
crowd out other topics, which simplifies the speech. Accordingly, this proportion measure
correlates strongly and negatively with the Shannon’s diversity index scores (-0.97).
Figure 1.2: Complexity by Party and Time
This figure is derived from a linear regression model where the dependent variable is complexity of a speech as measured with
a Shannon’s diversity index score. The index score has been re-scaled 0-1 with 1 representing the highest level of complexity.
The estimates in this figure are drawn from Model 1 in Appendix 1B’s Table 1.3. The distribution of speeches across days is
displayed by the hash marks on the bottom of the figure.
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Figure 1.3: Proportion of Speech Covered by Most Prevalent Topic
This figure is derived from a linear regression model where the dependent variable is complexity of a speech as measured with
a Shannon’s diversity index score. The index score has been re-scaled 0-1 with 1 representing the highest level of complexity.
The estimates in this figure are drawn from Model 1 in Appendix 1B’s Table 1.3. The distribution of speeches across days is
displayed by the hash marks on the bottom of the figure.
Figure 1.3 demonstrates that Democratic speeches are more concentrated near the upper
end of the distribution. This suggests that, relative to Republican speeches, Democratic
speeches tend to be dominated by a single topic. Indeed, only 20% of Democratic speeches
had a top topic that covered less than 50% of a speech, compared to 37% of Republican
speeches.
Figure 1.4 below models the proportion of each speech devoted to its own most preva-
lent topic as a function of party and time period. Since higher proportions indicate relative
simplicity, the expectation now is that Democratic speeches should demonstrate higher pre-
dicted values. Figure 1.4 reveals this to be the case. On average, the most prevalent topic
in a Democratic speech covers about 72% of the speech over the full duration of the health
care debate. For Republicans, the most prevalent topic covers less than 60% of a full speech
delivered in February 2009 and then rises to 65% by the end of March 2010. Figure 1.4 thus
provides a substantive understanding of what the simplicity of Democratic speeches looks
like. Nearly three-quarters of the average Democratic speech is devoted to a single idea.
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This leaves little room for consideration of multiple ideas in a single speech.
Figure 1.4: Proportion of Top Topic by Party and Time
This figure is derived from a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the proportion of a speech devoted to its
top topic. The estimates in this figure are drawn from Model 2 in Appendix 1B’s Table 1.3. The distribution of speeches across
days is displayed by the hash marks on the bottom of the figure.
Attention to Specific Topics
I predict in H4 that supporters of reform should focus more attention on problems and
goals than opponents of reform. In H5, I predict that opponents of reform should give more
attention to costs, unintended consequences, and the process of policy reform than supporters
of reform. Figure 1.5 below provides evidence in support of both hypotheses. The figure plots
the coefficients from seven separate linear regressions, each of which regresses the proportion
of a speech devoted to the topic on the party of the speaker. Democrats are coded 1 in the
party variable, which means the coefficients show the predicted change in topic proportion
resulting from a change in speaker from Republican to Democrat.
19
Figure 1.5: Effect of Party (Democrat) on Attention to Topics
Problems
Goals
Process
Government
Cuts
Business
Partisanship
-.2 0 .2 .4
Predicted Change in Proportion of Speech Devoted to a Topic
The plotted coefficients represent the effect of moving from the Republican to the Democratic Party on the proportion of
a speech devoted to each topic cluster. Each coefficient is derived from a separate linear regression model where the sole
independent variable is the political party of the speaker and the dependent variable is the proportion of the speech devoted to
the topic.
As predicted, Democrats – the supporters of reform in the health care debate – give more
attention to problems and goals than Republicans, who are the opponents of reform. Further,
the negative coefficients on party in the process model and partisanship model suggest that
Republicans spend more time discussing the process of policy reform than Democrats. The
coefficient on party from the cuts model – which, again, combines together discussion of
costs with cuts – also demonstrates that Republicans spend more time discussing this topic
than Democrats. Finally, the topic underlying the government model is discussion of the
expansion of the federal government and the dangers of an increased bureaucracy that would
result from the reform proposal. As expected, discussion of this unintended consequence of
reform is more prevalent among Republicans than Democrats.
Substantively, the effect of party in the Problem model deserves special note. Compared
to Republicans, Democrats devote nearly 40 percentage points more of their speeches to
lamenting the problems with the status quo of health care in the United States, and 44%
of the average Democratic speech is spent talking about such problems. When paired with
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a discussion of the goals of reform, the two topics account for nearly 68% of the average
Democratic speech, compared with only 21% of the average Republican speech.
This suggests that Democrats pursued a clear strategy in the health care reform debate:
focus most of the public’s attention on the ongoing health care crisis and underscore the
need to achieve lofty reform goals. Republicans largely avoided these talking points. Instead,
they focused on many different topics that diverted attention from the importance of reform.
These strategies align well with what my theory of elite debate predicts – namely, the use
and avoidance of complexity to, respectively, activate and undermine status quo bias.
Discussion and Conclusion
Political elites tailor their communication to suit their goals. On policy reform, support-
ers and opponents have different goals and, consequently, pursue different communication
strategies. Supporters of reform want to keep discussion of reform simple by focusing on a
small set of arguments – chiefly the problems with the status quo and the goals of reform.
Opponents of reform want to add complexity to the discussion by bringing up a wider range
of arguments and discussing complicating considerations like costs, cuts, and complaints
about the reform process. I have provided evidence in this paper for each of these expecta-
tions by classifying the range of arguments used in a recent national debate.
Theoretically, my results suggest that political elites’ rhetorical strategies involve two
sets of choices – decisions about content and decisions about structure. Previous work has
focused almost exclusively on the former. In line with that work, I find in this study that
supporters and opponents of reform do focus on different substantive ideas. My results also
reveal the second dimension of rhetorical strategy. Supporters of reform prefer a simpler
debate, and thus structure their rhetoric around a small number of arguments. Opponents
prefer complexity, and thus structure their rhetoric around many more arguments. These
findings suggest that opponents want to do more than just convince the public that reform
is a bad idea. They also want to overwhelm the public with ideas about reform, in the hope
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that citizens will retreat from their demands for change (Tyner 2017).
My results demonstrate that supporters and opponents of reform largely focus on dif-
ferent aspects of reform over the course of a debate. Normatively, this departs from what
we hope elite debates will accomplish. We want elites to engage in a back and forth about
the merits and pitfalls of reform so that the public can become better informed about all of
the relevant considerations. By challenging the other side’s points, elites can help point the
public toward the truth. Unfortunately, national policy debates fall short of this ideal. Each
side focuses on their favored talking points and largely ignores the considerations raised by
the other side.
These strategies leave the public less informed than we would like and indicate that there
is little room for nuance in discussions of policy reform. Opponents of reform ignore the
existing social ills that prompted a call for reform in the first place. Supporters of reform
opt out of the cost-benefit analyses that underlie responsible policy-making. This seemingly
leaves members of the public without strong allegiances to a particular policy outcome with
two bad choices: endorse bold reform proposals without regard for their unintended con-
sequences or opportunity costs, or be resigned that nothing can be done to solve pressing
problems. The structure and content of elite debate fails to provide a third option. Thus, far
from informing the public about pressing policy matters, and far from inviting the public to
provide input into the policy-making process, elite debate is designed to use the mass public
as a resource to either facilitate or undermine reform.
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Goal Clarity, Complexity, and
Issue Engagement in Direct Democracy
Empowering citizens to vote directly on legislation is a long-standing tradition in Amer-
ican politics. By removing legislators from their mediating role between the public and
policy, states allow citizens to directly engage with the trade-offs and uncertainties at the
heart of lawmaking. Researchers disagree about the public’s suitability for this task, par-
ticularly since the consequences of many ballot measures are often extensive. Nevertheless,
recent years have seen an increase in ballot initiatives and referenda across the states. In
the 2016 general election, voters across 34 states considered 154 ballot measures on topics
as diverse as the minimum wage, solar energy, and higher education administration. Almost
40% were decided by a margin smaller than 15 points, illustrating that a small number of
voters’ decisions can be consequential to policy outcomes.1
That citizens can ably make judicious policy decisions is far from obvious. Indeed, the
American public is notoriously disinterested and disengaged from politics. A common expla-
nation offered for the public’s political disinterest is the complexity of contemporary politics.
Political issues and arcane institutional rules are seen as too complicated for the average citi-
zen to follow. This helps explain the public’s interest in campaigns relative to policy-making
and, within policy-making, the greater interest in symbolic issues relative to more technical
issues (Nicholson 2003). If the political issues that citizens are asked to consider are too
complex, then we should not expect direct democracy to generate optimal policy solutions.
A subtle but important distinction exists between an issue’s inherent complexity and
whether citizens perceive the issue to be complex. The latter depends on how the issue is
conveyed to the public. Even on issues that involve highly technical solutions and widespread
1https://ballotpedia.org/2016_statewide_ballot_measure_election_results
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disagreement about the appropriate policy instruments, the public’s attention can be drawn
toward or away from complicating aspects of the issue. Voters’ decisions on policy issues can
be made simpler or more complex by the kinds of considerations that come to the fore.
Herein, I argue that the policy goals of a reform proposal are a key consideration that
can help simplify voters’ decision-making. Policy goals convey what a reform proposal is
trying to accomplish, and they often involve a social outcome that many citizens consider
important. The goals of a reform proposal are relatively easy to evaluate, since voters need
only ask themselves whether they find the social outcome to be agreeable. When the reform
goals constitute voters’ primary consideration about a proposal, voters should be more able
and willing to deliver policy decisions about it.
Clearly conveyed policy goals in the text of ballot measures should make citizens more
likely to participate in direct democracy and more likely to support reform when they do so.
Voters should be more willing to participate because clearly conveyed goals make issues seem
less complex and strengthen citizens’ attitudes about the underlying issue. They should also
be more willing, on average, to support reform when they understand the measure’s goals,
because agreeable goals help voters overcome status quo bias. Further, voters’ political pre-
dispositions should be more predictive of their decision when the goals of reform are clear,
because voters more easily see how their predispositions line up to the ballot measure.
I test these expectations through two studies. First, I analyze voter behavior on a set
of 81 ballot measures appearing across 13 states in the 2012 general election, where I find
evidence that clear goals make citizens more likely to participate, more likely to support
reform, and better able to align the issue to their predispositions. In a second study, I con-
struct an original survey with an embedded experiment to test two mechanisms underlying
my theory: perceiving the policy goals of reform to be clear should make ballot measures
seem less complex and should make citizens’ attitudes about the measures stronger. I find
support for both expectations.
My findings suggest that policy goals play a central role in voters’ response to reform
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proposals. They simplify the decision context and help voters see policy issues in terms of
familiar lines of political conflict. This allows voters to develop policy attitudes and hold
them with enough confidence to apply these attitudes to their vote choices. This study thus
demonstrates the behavioral effects of a key piece of information – namely, how clearly the
policy goals of reform are conveyed to voters. In turn, understanding how this feature of
ballot measures affects citizen response provides leverage on larger questions about issue
mobilization in the mass public.
Goal Clarity in Policy Reform Disputes
I argue that an important factor determining how citizens will understand and respond
to a ballot measure is the clarity of its goals. Any reform of the policy status quo is designed
to achieve at least one social or political goal. These can range from reducing recidivism in
the criminal justice system, to strengthening charter schools, to ensuring the fiscal solvency
of public goods. Policy goals represent the starting point of most debates over issue reforms.
They are the best argument that supporters of reform can make to the public: there’s a
worthy goal that we can achieve, and the policy instrument before you will help achieve it.
Accordingly, reform supporters campaign vigorously to promote a reform’s policy goals and
the problems they will directly address, while opponents focus on anything else (Tyner 2016).
Policy goals are identifiable by three characteristics.
First, policy goals are instrumental. They accomplish particular objectives with partic-
ular policy instruments. They differ in this way from other common accounts of goals, such
as the one laid out by Stone (2012). For Stone, goals are abstract ideas. They represent
“the enduring values of community life” that we use to evaluate specific policy proposals
(Stone 2012, 14). The instrumental goals in my definition are linked to terminal concepts,
though. Stone’s terminal goals – equity, welfare, liberty, security, and efficiency – are just
one step removed from policy goals, and they serve as policy goals’ ultimate rationale. The
reason to accomplish the policy goal of expanding health insurance coverage is to achieve
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welfare and equity. As terminal goals, welfare and equity require no justification – they
speak for themselves. Policy goals, by contrast, often require justification. Thus, citizens
could plausibly agree or disagree with a particular policy goal.
Second, policy goals are purposeful since they refer to a higher political end. On ballot
measures, a subtle but important distinction exists between the policy goal and what the
measure directly accomplishes. Often the latter is clearly stated, such that the direct effect
of a ballot measure is clear, even when the purpose of that effect is unclear. One exam-
ple from the analysis below is a ballot measure to allow a single, named company to open
one casino in a specific county in the state. What this measure is aiming to accomplish is
clear – opening a casino in a specific location – but why it is happening is left unstated.
A measure’s goals are about the why: they are the answer a proponent would give if they
were asked why they were supporting it. Goals are what one finds in party platforms and
campaign websites: supporting public education, eliminating fraud and waste in government
programs, or reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Opening a single location in a single county
will never find itself on a campaign website or party platform. Goals, by contrast, address
an important social concern.
Finally, policy goals address widely recognized public concerns. As such, they are mo-
tivating. They provide a reason for citizens to participate that goes beyond civic duty. In
elections, goals are the promises that parties and politicians make to voters, and they un-
derlie the exchange of support between them. On a ballot measure, goals convey why the
specific policy changes contained in the measure should be supported in the first place. Pol-
icy goals are central to political decision-making (Stone 2012).
Thus, the primary consideration voters face when deciding to support or oppose a reform
proposal is whether its policy goals are agreeable or disagreeable. Without understanding
whether a proposal accomplishes a goal worth supporting, a voter cannot develop a clear
position on it. Holding a clear position underlies strong attitudes and a firm commitment
to one side or the other. Voters thus require a clear position to vote on the reform instead
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of abstaining. Accordingly, voters should be more likely to vote on a ballot measure when
they better comprehend the goals it is aiming to accomplish.
On ballot measures, a primary way that voters come to understand reform goals is the
text of the measure itself. For many voters, their first encounter with the measure is in
the voting booth, so any considerations about the goals of reform have to derive from what
they read. The text of a ballot measure can make its purpose relatively clear or unclear.
The goal clarity of a ballot measure increases as the policy goals underlying the measure are
articulated more explicitly or as the goals can be more easily deduced from the ballot text.
As an example, the following ballot measure from Michigan in 2012 has a relatively clear
goal: “Proposal 12-3, the Renewable Energy Amendment, would require utilities to obtain
at least 25% of their electricity from clean renewable energy sources, which are wind, solar,
biomass, and hydropower, by 2025.” The goal of the measure is made explicit by its name:
the promotion of renewable energy. Even without the name, voters should be able to deduce
the purpose of the measure from the specific policy change it would effect. By contrast, the
underlying goal of the following ballot measure from Arizona is relatively unclear: “Proposi-
tion 117 sets a limit on the annual percentage increase in property values used to determine
property taxes to no more than 5% above the previous year, and establishes a single limited
property value as the basis for determining all property taxes on real property, beginning
in 2020.” Nowhere in the text of the measure is the ultimate policy goal made explicit.
Further, only voters with a high level of sophistication will comprehend that the purpose of
the measure is to lower the overall property tax rate.
Clearly conveyed policy goals help citizens develop a clear position on the measure and
hold it with firm conviction. Once a voter understands that Proposal 12-3, for example,
is designed to promote renewable energy, her decision rule on the measure becomes easier:
support the measure if she agrees with the policy goal, or oppose the measure if she disagrees
with it. Undoubtedly other considerations will impact many voters’ decisions to support or
oppose the measure. What matters is that without first comprehending the goal, a voter has
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no basis for developing a position. Thus, she will be more likely to abstain from the vote.
Further, competing considerations about a policy issue can make citizens uncertain and
prompt political disengagement (Zaller & Feldman 1992). In the context of ballot measures,
considerations that pull voters in both directions can cause them to abstain from voting
on the measure. A clear policy goal enables voters to look for just enough information
to provide a confident decision without performing an exhaustive information search or ef-
fortful processing (Simon 1985, Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012). When the policy
goal is important enough to a voter to prompt a strong reaction, competing considerations
about the measure can be more easily dismissed. In this way, clear policy goals simplify
decision-making by allowing for satisficing behavior.
• H1: Voters should be more likely to vote on a ballot measure when its goals are clearer.
Owned and Unowned Policy Goals
Clear goals should prompt citizens to vote on a ballot measure instead of abstaining.
Whether they vote to support or oppose it depends on the content of the goal. For policy
goals that are unassociated with a particular party, clear policy goals should increase support
for reform. For policy goals that are the subject of partisan conflict, clearly conveyed policy
goals should help voters register a vote choice that aligns with their political predispositions.
Policy goals vary by how closely they are aligned with a party or an ideological camp.
Some goals have become owned by one party over time – for example, limiting access to
firearms or reducing the regulatory burden on businesses. By contrast, other goals share a
consensus across political divisions, such as fostering economic growth (Egan 2013). The
distinction between ideological and shared goals is distinct from but closely related to the
difference between position and valence issues (Fiorina 1981).
Clearly conveyed shared and ideological goals in the text of ballot measures should facil-
itate voters’ decision-making by helping them meet their psychological needs. Shared goals,
in particular, should help voters address their status quo bias. An extensive psychological
literature suggests that people are risk-averse and predisposed to favor the status quo, which
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biases their preferences in favor of maintain existing arrangements over pursuing alternatives
(Eidelman & Crandall 2012, Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991). Individuals’ preferences
for precedent and their tendency to see changes (and the people seeking them) as extreme
and unreasonable make their default position opposition to change, particularly when they
feel uncertainty about it (Fernandez & Rodrik 1991). This owes, in part, to people’s ten-
dency to misperceive changes to the status quo as overly drastic (Enelow & Hinich 1984).
Bias in favor of the status quo has been used to explain the challenges of achieving reform
on policy preferences, procedural matters, and election outcomes (Eckles, Kam, Maestas &
Schaffner 2014, Kam & Simas 2012, Zink & Dawes 2015, MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman &
Keele 2007).
Status quo bias will be particularly strong when the goals of reform are unclear. The
uncertainty of change can be tolerated when the goals of reform are worthy enough. When
there is no clear goal guiding the reform, the certainty of the status quo should win out.
Without an active reason to support a reform effort – an active reason that would be pro-
vided by clearly understanding a reform’s goals – voters’ status quo bias will cause them to
default toward opposing it. When a ballot measure’s goal is both clearly understood and
shared across political divisions, voters should respond by supporting it.
• H2: For ballot measures with shared goals, goal clarity increases support for reform.
Because shared goals are agreeable across political divisions, their clarity in ballot text
should increase support among all voters. By contrast, the effect of clearly conveyed ideo-
logical goals should depend on voters’ political commitments. Ideological goals allow voters
to see ballot measures in partisan, ideological, and group-based terms. Voters’ response to
ballot measures with clear ideological goals should depend on their political predispositions.
Partisan identity, ideological commitments, and group attachments are important predis-
positions for voters. They are symbolic attitudes that voters want to maintain when making
decisions, and their strength means that issue positions more often conform to predisposi-
tions than vice versa (Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012, Lenz 2012, Sears, Lau, Tyler &
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Allen 1980). Voters want their political decisions to align with their longer-standing political
commitments. Accordingly, party and group cues often influence voter decision-making on
ballot measures (Boudreau & MacKenzie 2014, Lupia 1994).
In the absence of group cues in the text of a ballot measure, voters must rely on other
features of the text to determine whether they should support or oppose it. Clearly con-
veyed ideological goals help voters make this decision by providing a strong signal about the
partisan or ideological agenda behind the measure. Even an unsophisticated voter will know
that a measure to restrict abortion rights was generated by conservatives and Republicans.
Thus, if clear ideological goals help voters connect their predispositions to ballot measures,
voters’ predispositions should be more predictive of their vote choice when goals are clear.
• H3: For ballot measures with ideological goals, goal clarity helps citizens vote in line
with their predispositions.
Clarity and Complexity in Direct Democracy
Above, I propose that goal clarity is an important characteristic that determines how
citizens evaluate ballot measures. A necessary step in developing the case that goal clarity
guides such decisions is to distinguish it from other ballot characteristics that might influence
voting decisions – particularly characteristics that shape how complex a ballot measure
seems. Here, I conceptually distinguish goal clarity from two prominent concepts in the
direct democracy literature. Later, I assess their empirical relationships.
The first related concept is the difficulty of the underlying issue of the policy reform.
Issues are often considered hard or easy according to the classification system developed
by Carmines and Stimson, where hard issues tend to revolve around economic matters and
the management of public resources and hard issues are those categorized as social (1980).
Ballot measures with easy issues have been found to prompt greater awareness and greater
participation than ballot measures with hard issues (Milita 2017, Milita 2015, Nicholson
2003). Along similar lines, voters are less willing to vote on and less willing to support ballot
measures featuring a large volume of discrete policy changes, which is often characteristic of
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reform on hard issues (Hessami 2016).
A second related concept is the presentation of the ballot text. The word count and
readability of a ballot measure often serve as measures of its complexity (Reilly & Richey
2011, Milita 2015). The former has been found to decrease willingness to vote on measures.
Similarly, longer ballots that include many propositions interfere with voters’ ability to
translate their policy preferences into a vote choice (Selb 2008). Researchers have also found
that framing measures in terms of protections versus rights and in terms of repealing an
existing policy can decrease support for reform. These frames also make those who would
otherwise support reform abstain, effects that are as strong or stronger on easy issues than
hard issues (Hastings & Cann 2014, Burnett & Kogan 2015).
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that the content and presentation of a ballot
measure shape voter behavior. What these studies of complexity miss, though, is the question
that voters ask themselves first when considering a ballot measure: namely, are the goals of
this measure worth supporting or opposing? Hard issues and lengthy ballot texts might make
it more difficult for a voter to think through the consequences of a measure, but that does
not mean the measure is inscrutable. With a clear policy goal guiding their considerations,
voters can register a confident vote choice about easy and hard issues alike.
Study 1: Data and Design
To test the expectations articulated above, I turn to the 2012 ANES Direct Democracy
study, a two-wave panel that was administered shortly before and after the 2012 general
election. 5,415 participants were recruited from 13 states that had measures on the ballot
that year. Respondents were shown the measures’ texts and asked a series of questions
about each one. The number of ballot measures each respondent saw depended on their
state, ranging from 2 to 11.
These data are well suited to distinguish between two theories of issue engagement: one
prioritizing the category of the underlying issue (easy or hard), and the other prioritizing
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how clearly the goals are conveyed. Because the 81 ballot measures vary by issue area and
goal clarity, the expectations from both theories can be simultaneously tested.
By including questions about each ballot measure’s ideological, partisan, and group as-
sociations, the ANES data also allow the mechanisms behind my theory of participation
and support to be tested. Further, the ANES data provide questions necessary for both a
political sophistication control variable and a measure of symbolic ideology. Finally, by fo-
cusing on real ballot measures that most respondents had the chance to learn about and vote
on outside of the survey environment, this study has a particularly high degree of external
validity.
Variables
Above, I suggest that the clarity of a ballot measure’s goals affects citizens’ decisions
to participate in the direct democracy process. It also affects their decisions to support or
oppose the measure. I rely on two variables from the ANES to measure these concepts. Issue
participation is measured as a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent voted
on the ballot measure (1) or abstained (0). Support for reform is a dichotomous variable
indicating whether the respondent voted in favor of (1) or against (0) a particular measure.
Only respondents who voted at all on the ballot measure are included in this variable.
The key concept at the center of my theory is goal clarity. Goal clarity refers to how clear
the goals or overall purpose of a ballot measure is from its text. It is a hand-coded measure
based on the text of the ballot measure, and it can take on values of 0, 0.5, or 1, where 1
represents very clear goals. The coding guidelines are as follows: “How easy or difficult is
it to understand the goal(s) of this ballot measure? Goals should be thought of as a central
purpose of the ballot measure. If you asked the proponents why they were in favor of a ballot
measure, the goal would be their answer. Examples: funding K-12 education; protecting the
sanctity of life; limiting campaign contributions and spending.” A ballot measure’s goal or
purpose can differ from what it directly accomplishes. Often the latter is clearly stated, such
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that the direct effect of a measure is clear, even when its purpose is unclear. One example
from the data analyzed below is a proposal to allow a single, specific company to open one
casino in a specific county in the state (Arkansas). What this ballot measure is aiming to
accomplish is clear – opening a casino in a specific location in Arkansas – but why it is
happening is left unstated.2
As I note above, I also wish to account for other ballot characteristics that might de-
termine voters’ decisions, and which will help assess the distinctiveness of my goal clarity
measure. The first of these is whether an issue is easy or hard, which I include as a dummy
variable in the analyses below. The definitions of easy or hard are borrowed from Ellis and
Stimson (2012): social issues are easy and economic issues are hard. This definition is po-
tentially simplistic, particularly on ballot measures that mix elements of both. Even so, it
remains a useful generalization. I classify a measure as economic if the underlying issue is
about regulation of economic conduct or the management of public goods and programs, and
I classify a measure as social if the issue is about the regulation of personal, non-economic
conduct. Social issues also include law and order ballot measures and other measures that
feature culturally salient issues. Ballot measures that focus primarily on procedural reforms
are neither social nor economic. I classify them as hard because they fit the definition of
hard issues that Carmines and Stimson (1980) lay out in their original article.
Because citizens’ voting decisions are also shaped by the ideological tilt of the ballot mea-
sure, I include a variable assessing the direction of policy reform that takes three categories.
The excluded category is that the policy reform is neither liberal nor conservative. The
non-excluded categories are that reform pushes policy in a liberal direction and that reform
pushes policy in a conservative direction. A ballot measure is considered to move policy in a
liberal direction if it addressed traditional concerns of the political left (e.g. raising revenues
2To assess the reliability of this measure, I trained two undergraduate students to hand-code the full set
of 81 ballot measures. The weighted Cohen’s kappa coefficients between each student’s codes and my own
were 0.60 and 0.57, respectively. These coefficients are moderate. Accordingly, I include in Appendix 2A
replications of each table and figure in Study 1 with the average of the two coders’ clarity scores substituted
for my own. Most results are robust across both sets of scores.
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and tax rates; greater financial support for welfare programs and public education; broaden-
ing access to marijuana). A measure is considered to move policy in a conservative direction
if it addressed traditional concerns of the political rights (e.g. capping public revenues and
lower tax rates; limiting access to abortion; adopting a more punitive approach to combat-
ting crime). A measure is considered to move policy in neither direction if it addresses a
policy concern unassociated with the left or right (e.g. reorganizing government operations
to make them run more efficiently). Ballot measures that address concerns of both the left
and the right are also categorized as neither.
It is also important to account for respondent-level characteristics that help determine
vote choice, and which might interact with ballot characteristics. As such, I measure how
informed the respondent is about each measure they read and each respondent’s ideology. I
also include an additional control for political sophistication, discussed below.
Respondents reported how informed they were about each ballot measure they saw on
a 1-5 scale, where 5 indicates the highest level of information about a measure (rescaled to
0-1 below). This independent variable thus varies both by individual and by ballot measure.
I include this self-reported variable to account for differences in the campaign environment
surrounding each ballot measure. Presumably some of the measures received more attention
from media outlets and statewide political organizations than others. Further, voters’ un-
derstanding of a measure should increase as media and campaign attention increases, which
should make them more comfortable voting on it instead of abstaining. Since partisan ballot
measures are more likely to be subject to organized campaigning, controlling for respondents’
level of information addresses this potential confound.
Respondent ideology is measured as a seven-item symbolic ideology score that ranges
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. This measure correlates strongly (0.74)
with an 11-item operational ideology scale I constructed from 11 opinion items (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.84), but because of missing values on the operational scale, I use the symbolic
scale in the analyses below.
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Beyond these central predictors, I also include a range of additional ballot-level and
individual-level controls. To account for other measures of complexity in the direct democ-
racy literature, I control for each ballot measure’s word count and readability3. I also control
for respondents’ level of political sophistication4 and the state where each respondent lives5.
The dependent variables discussed above are either dichotomous or categorical. In the
analyses to follow, I run a series of logistic or ordered logistic regression models to test
my hypotheses. Each model includes random effects for individual respondents to account
for any clustering, since each respondent answered questions about more than one ballot
measure. The central independent variable in each model is goal clarity, per my theory.
Study 1: Results
Above, I discuss how goal clarity is conceptually distinct from other ballot features that
might determine citizens’ responses. Of course, even if there is a conceptual line to be
drawn, it is important to establish that goal clarity is empirically distinguishable from these
other factors. I begin by assessing whether goal clarity empirically separates enough to be
considered as an independent predictor of how citizens respond to ballot measures.
Table 2.1 shows the distribution across clarity scores of four ballot measure-level control
variables. The measures of word count and readability are evenly distributed across the
3Readability is measured by reverse coding the text’s Flesch–Kincaid grade level score, which is a com-
monly accepted measure of the reading level required for comprehension. It is calculated as (0.39*(total
words/total sentences) + 11.8*(total syllables/total words) - 15.59). Higher scores indicate the ballot mea-
sure is easier to comprehend.
4Political sophistication is measured as each respondent’s ability trait score (θ), which is extracted from
a three-parameter IRT model of 11 binary items about respondents’ political knowledge and participation:
correct answers to four knowledge questions (length of term for a U.S. Senator; the purpose of Medicare; the
relative amount of federal spending on foreign aid; and the party controlling the U.S. House); participation
in six political activities (voting in the 2012 general election; signing an online petition; signing a paper
petition; calling into a radio or TV program about a political issue; sending a social media message about
a political issue; and writing to a newspaper or magazine about a political issue); and correctly identifying
the Democratic Party as relatively liberal and the Republican Party as relatively conservative
5The ANES includes ballot measures from 13 states. Each respondent only saw measures that appeared
on their state’s 2012 general election ballot. The number of measures varies between 2 and 11 depending on
the state.
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three levels of goal clarity. Further, the goal clarity of ballot measures featuring a hard issue
varies considerably, though measures with easy issues tend to also have clearer goals. Easy
issues are often highly salient, focused on symbolic concerns, and long-standing features on
the national political agenda (Ellis & Stimson 2012). Accordingly, it is more difficult to
mask the underlying goal of an easy issue reform than a reform of a hard issue. All the
same, Table 2.1 demonstrates that my goal clarity variable measures something different
than these other measures of complexity.
Table 2.1: Distribution of ballot characteristics across clarity scores.
Clarity = 0 (unclear) Clarity = 0.5 Clarity = 1 (clear)
Easy issue 0 3 16
Hard issue 22 14 26
Readability above median 12 6 23
Readability below median 10 11 19
Word count above median 10 12 18
Word count below median 12 5 24
Liberal reform 2 3 21
Conservative reform 1 8 8
Neither liberal nor conservative 19 6 13
Turning to the hypotheses, the prediction in H1 is that voters will be more likely to vote on
a ballot measure as its goals become clearer. Model 1 in Table 2.2 shows evidence in support
of this hypothesis. The dependent variable is voting on a measure, instead of abstaining,
and it is estimated as a logistic regression model with random effects for respondents.
The coefficient on the goal clarity variable, as expected, is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that clearer goals increase the likelihood of voting. Substantively, a
change in goal clarity from 0 to 1 increases the predicted probability of voting on a ballot
measure by 3.6 percentage points.6 In line with expectations, respondents are also less
likely to vote on hard issues and are more likely to vote on measures as their own political
sophistication and level of information about the measure increase. In contrast to claims
from the literature, readability has no effect on likelihood of voting, and increasing the word
6The 3.6 percentage point shift is calculated when all of the scaled covariates are set at their mean and
the categorical covariates are set to their modes: a hard issue that moves policy in neither a liberal nor
conservative direction in the state of California.
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count of a measure actually increases the chances that a respondent votes on it. I had no
expectations about the effect of ideology, but respondents become significantly more likely
to vote on a ballot measure as their level of conservatism increases.
Table 2.2: Respondents are more likely to vote on all measures and support non-ideological measures as their goals become
clearer.
(1) (2)
Vote Support
Goal Clarity 0.86∗∗ (0.11) 0.97∗∗ (0.07)
Hard Issue -0.25∗ (0.10) 0.72∗∗ (0.11)
Liberal Reform 0.27∗ (0.11)
Conservative Reform -0.05 (0.09)
Ideology 0.98∗∗ (0.34) -0.37∗∗ (0.14)
Readability -0.49 (0.33) -0.37 (0.25)
Word Count 0.94∗∗ (0.23) -1.44∗∗ (0.17)
Sophistication 5.49∗∗ (0.55) -0.42+ (0.24)
Level of Information 3.57∗∗ (0.18) 0.10 (0.11)
Constant 2.28∗∗ (0.64) 2.70∗∗ (0.37)
Observations 25,666 10,377
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Both models are logit with weights and random effects for individual respondents. On the left, the dependent variable is coded 1
if the respondent voted on the measure and 0 if she abstained. On the right, the dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent
voted in favor of the measure and 0 if she voted against. All variables are coded 0-1. Clarity of goals can take on values of
0, 0.5, or 1, where 1 indicates that the goals of the ballot measure are very clear. Only respondents who voted in the 2012
general election are included in the model on the left; in the model on the right, only respondents who voted in the 2012 general
election and voted on the measure are included. The model on the right is restricted to non-ideological ballot measures.
The second hypothesis predicts that voters are more likely to support a ballot measure
when its goals are both shared and clear. Accordingly, I restrict the sample of ballot measures
to those that move policy in neither a liberal nor conservative direction for this test. Beyond
the change in sample, Model 2 in Table 2.2 fully replicates the first model but with a new
dependent variable: voting in support of the ballot measure. Here again the coefficient on
goal clarity is positive and statistically significant, providing support for H2. Further, a
change in goal clarity from 0 to 1 increases the predicted probability of supporting reform
by 17.1 percentage points.7 The coefficient on the hard issue dummy variable is positive
and significant, indicating that once citizens have decided to vote on a measure, hard issue
reforms are more likely to receive support than easy issue reforms. As with the previous
model, the readability of a measure has no effect on voters’ likelihood of supporting it. In
7As with the first model, the predicted probability change is calculated with the scaled covariates set at
their means and the categorical covariates set at their mode.
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line with expectations from the literature, longer word counts make voters more likely to vote
against a measure. Interestingly, voters become less likely to support reform as they become
more conservative, perhaps reflecting a status quo bias within the conservative ideology.
Clear goals should also help voters connect their ideologies to their vote choice. On
measures with ideological goals, ideology should thus become more predictive of vote choice
as goal clarity increases (H3). To test this hypothesis, I replicate the second model in
Table 2.2, but with an interaction between goal clarity and respondent ideology. Further,
I separately the analyses by the direction of reform achieved by the ballot measure. The
expectation is that moving across the range of respondent ideology – extremely liberal to
extremely conservative – should make voters more likely to support conservative measures
and less likely to support liberal measures as their goals become clearer.
Figure 2.1 tests this expectation by showing the marginal effect that a change in ideology
has on the probability of supporting reform across different levels of goal clarity for liberal
and conservative reforms. The results support H3. At the lowest level of goal clarity, the
effects of ideology on support for conservative and liberal reforms are indistinguishable from
zero. The effects increase in magnitude and in the predicted opposing directions as the
goals of a measure become clearer. They are also substantively large. On liberal reforms,
strong conservatives are just as likely as strong conservatives to support reform when the
goals are unclear. By contrast, when the goals are clear, the probability of support a liberal
reform drops by over 40 percentage points when ideology shifts from strong liberal to strong
conservative. The same shift in ideology results in a nearly 40 percentage point increase in
likelihood of supporting conservative reforms when their goals are clear. The full model from
which this figure is derived is contained in Appendix 2A below.
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Each figure is derived from a logit model with weights and random effects for respondents where the dependent variable is 1
if the respondent voted in favor of a measure and 0 if she voted against. On the left, the measures push policy in a liberal
direction. On the right, the measures push policy in a conservative direction. The marginal effect is the change in probability
of voting in favor of the measure as a respondent moves from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, and as the clarity
of the goals moves from unclear (0) to clear (1). The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. A -.5 marginal effect indicates,
for example, that the probability of voting in favor of reform has dropped by 50 percentage points. The same set of controls
included in the models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are included here, with continuous variables set at their mean, the hard issue
dummy set at 1 (indicating a hard issue), and the state set as California. Only respondents who voted in the 2012 general
election and voted on the measure are included in these models.
Activation of Predispositions as a Mechanism
Above, I suggest that, for ballot measures with ideological goals, goal clarity activates
political predispositions. The ANES dataset provides three additional measures that might
help establish this as a mechanism giving rise to the result in Figure 2.1. First, the ANES
asked respondents to place each ballot measure they read on a 7-point ideological scale
(extremely liberal to extremely conservative). If activation of predispositions is the key
mechanism, then we should expect ballot measures to seem more ideologically extreme as
the clarity of their goals increases.8
Second, the ANES asked respondents whether they thought businesses, labor unions, the
governor of their state, the Democratic Party, or the Republican Party were campaigning
in support or opposition of each ballot measure they read. I make the assumption that
respondents will answer yes to one or both of the parties if they think the ballot measure
has a partisan bent to it, even if they have not seen any campaign materials from the named
8I measure ideological extremity by folding the placement variable at its midpoint. This produces a 4-
item scale where 0 indicates the respondent thought of the ballot measure as moderate and 3 indicates she
thought of it as extremely liberal or extremely conservative.
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party. Thus, I construct a measure of perceived partisanship from that set of questions, and
my expectation is that clear goals will make respondents more likely to think of a ballot
measure as partisan.
Third, I expect that ballot measures with clear goals should be seen as closely aligned
with salient social groups. I test this with an open-ended response question that respondents
were provided for each ballot measure they read. On this question, they were asked to name
the group of people who would be most affected by the ballot measure. The variable is binary,
with 0 representing either a non-response to that question or a generalized response and 1
representing a substantive response. Non-responses are theoretically interesting because they
indicate that a respondent could not name a specific group affected by the proposal. Thus,
non-responses are included in the analysis and not treated as missing data.9 To measure
whether the associated social group is salient, I construct a dichotomous variable indicating
whether, among those respondents who typed in a specific group, they had any kind of
emotional reaction to it. This was constructed from a 7-item like/dislike scale, where 4
(neither like nor dislike) is coded as 0 and 1-3 or 5-7 are coded as 1. My expectations are
that clear policy goals should make respondents more likely to name a group, and more likely
to have an affective reaction to the group they named.
I test each of these expectations by replicating the second model in Table 2.2 with the
four dependent variables just described. The results are contained in Table 2.3. As expected,
the coefficient on goal clarity is positive and statistically significant across all four models. As
the goals of an ideological measure become clearer, the measure is seen as more ideologically
extreme, more partisan, and more associated with social groups, particularly groups that
9A non-response is specifically defined as leaving the open response blank or typing in some variant
of “none,” “no groups,” “nobody,” “no one,” “I don’t know,” “I can’t say,” “I have no idea,” “I don’t
understand,” “I’m not sure,” “who cares,” “who knows,” “unknown,” “uncertain,” “idk,” “hard to say,”
or “NA.” A generalized response is any variant of “all,” “everyone,” “all people,” “all citizens,” “citizens,”
“individuals,” “all individuals,” “all races,” “us all,” “a lot,” “the population,” “general public,” “all classes,”
“humans,” “society,” “society at large,” or “all of us.” Respondents were also scored as 0 on this measure if
they typed in only a single character, if their response only included digits, or if their response was “many,”
“most,” “some,” “few,” or “one.”
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evoke an emotional response. Substantively, a change in goal clarity from 0 (the lowest
level of clarity) to 1 (the highest level of clarity) makes respondents 9.42 percentage points
more likely to see a ballot measure as partisan, 21.56 percentage points more likely to name
a specific social group affected by it, and 8.65 percentage points more likely to have an
emotional reaction to the named group. Additionally, a shift from the lowest to the highest
level of clarity makes respondents 6.51 percentage points less likely to claim that the ballot
measure is at the lowest level of ideological extremity (moderate).
Table 2.3: Clear goals make ideological measures seem more ideologically extreme, partisan, and relevant to salient social
groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extremity Partisanship Group Named Affective Group Response
Goal Clarity 0.41∗∗ (0.11) 0.78∗∗ (0.11) 1.76∗∗ (0.11) 0.60∗∗ (0.14)
Hard Issue -0.05 (0.08) -0.48∗∗ (0.07) -0.07 (0.06) -0.50∗∗ (0.08)
Conservative Reform -0.56∗∗ (0.08) 0.31∗∗ (0.07) -0.60∗∗ (0.07) 0.21∗ (0.09)
Ideology 0.47∗ (0.22) 0.30 (0.22) -0.21 (0.21) 0.60∗∗ (0.20)
Readability 0.10 (0.26) 0.23 (0.23) -1.23∗∗ (0.23) -1.01∗∗ (0.27)
Word Count -0.07 (0.22) -1.02∗∗ (0.21) 0.85∗∗ (0.20) 0.25 (0.24)
Sophistication 4.49∗∗ (0.46) 3.43∗∗ (0.36) 4.76∗∗ (0.36) 1.37∗∗ (0.35)
Level of Information 1.53∗∗ (0.14) 0.72∗∗ (0.11) 0.77∗∗ (0.11) 0.69∗∗ (0.13)
Constant -1.87∗∗ (0.35) -2.56∗∗ (0.35) -0.82∗ (0.35)
State Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,068 14,258 14,258 8,816
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
The dependent variables across the four models are, respectively: perceived ideological extremity of the measure (coded 0-3);
whether or not the respondent thought at least one party campaigned in favor or against the measure; whether or not a specific
affected group could be named; and whether or not respondents had an emotional reaction to the group they named. All
independent variables are coded 0-1. Clarity of goals can take on values of 0, 0.5, or 1, where 1 indicates that the goals of
the ballot measure are very clear. Model 1 is ordered logit with clustered standard errors, weights, and random effects for
individual respondents, and models 2-4 are logit with weights and random effects for individual respondents. These models
include ballot measures that moved policy in either a liberal or conservative direction. Only respondents who voted in the 2012
general election are included.
Study 2: Data and Design
Study 1 demonstrated that clear policy goals make citizens more likely to vote on ballot
measures and more likely to support reform when the measure’s goals are shared across the
ideological spectrum. By contrast, when a measure pushes policy in a liberal or conservative
direction, clear goals help voters align their vote choice with their ideologies. This is because
clear goals help voters see the relationship between an ideological measure and broader
ideological, partisan, and group-based conflicts.
Study 1 thus found evidence for behavioral effects resulting from clear policy goals. It
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also pointed toward a mechanism underlying some of those relationships: namely, helping
voters see ballot measures in terms of their political predispositions. Left untested in Study
1 are two additional mechanisms suggested by my theory. Study 2 tests these mechanisms
and introduces a random assignment to supplement Study 1’s observational findings.
Clear policy goals should make ballot measures seem less complex. By providing a clear
reason to support or oppose a measure, clear goals help citizens downweight competing
considerations that push them in either direction (Zaller & Feldman 1992). When the policy
goal is the central consideration that a citizen has to weigh, it helps clarify the decision-
making process and simplify the vote choice.
• H4: Voters should see a ballot measure as less complex as the measure’s goals are
perceived to be clearer.
Further, clear policy goals should strengthen citizens’ issue attitudes. Competing consid-
erations about a measure can lead to ambivalent reactions, which should weaken attitudes.
By contrast, when a single consideration comes to the fore – namely, whether one supports or
opposes the measure’s policy goal – citizens’ attitudes should become stronger. Evaluating
a policy goal is a relatively easy task, so citizens should have confidence in their resulting
policy opinion. Additionally, Study 1 demonstrated that clear policy goals help citizens
see ballot measures in terms of their political predispositions. Because citizens have strong
attitudes about those predispositions, clear policy goals should also result in strong issue
attitudes (Sears et al. 1980).
• H5: Voters’ attitudes about a ballot measure should strengthen as the measure’s goals
are perceived to be clearer.
Study 2 tests both mechanisms through an original survey with an embedded experiment.
In the experiment, I manipulate the clarity of ballot measures’ goals, which allows me to
isolate the effect of goal clarity more directly than in Study 1. Further, Study 2 builds on
Study 1 by providing measures of core theoretical concepts that were not available in the first
study (attitude strength, perceived complexity) and more valid measures of some variables
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that were available (perceived partisanship of each measure).
The survey was administered to a convenience sample of 371 undergraduate students
across four sections of an Introduction to American Politics class at a large public univer-
sity, yielding 367 respondents who completed the survey. Respondents were first shown the
following preamble: “On the following four pages, you will be shown four different ballot
proposals that would make changes in policy. For each ballot proposal, you will be asked
some questions about the goals of the proposal, the policy changes it might make, the prob-
lems it is designed to address, and a handful of additional questions.” Each respondent was
shown four different ballot measures. For each one, they were informed that it might appear
on the ballot in 2018 in the state in which the university is located before reading the text
of the measure. After reading the text of each measure, respondents answered a series of
questions about them, which are discussed in greater detail below.
The four proposals were adapted from the ballot measures appearing in the 2012 ANES
Direct Democracy study. Small adjustments were made to each measure so that it referred
to the state in which the university is located instead of whichever state it was drawn from,
and so that it referred to 2018 and not 2012. Two of the measures that each respondent
read were drawn randomly from a list of 14, which were themselves selected from the 81
included on the ANES. The 14 were chosen specifically to generate variation in goal clarity.
Accordingly, seven of the 14 measures have relatively clear goals while the remaining seven
have relatively unclear goals. The full list of 14 measures is contained in Appendix 2B.
The other two measures that respondents saw were also drawn from the ANES study
and were subject to experimental manipulation. I chose two measures for the experiment
that had relatively unclear goals, and in the control condition, respondents saw them as they
appeared on the ANES (again, with small adjustments to make them about the university’s
state instead of the original state they were drawn from). In the treatment condition, I added
a short phrase near the front of each proposal that clarified the policy goal being pursued
by the proposal.
The control and treatment conditions for the first proposal are as follows:
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Control: Proposal 1 would phase down the debt limit percentage in three steps
from nine to eight percent and modify the calculation date, calculation period,
and the term general state revenues.
Treatment: Proposal 1 would reduce government spending by phasing down
the debt limit percentage in three steps from nine to eight percent and modifying
the calculation date, calculation period, and the term general state revenues.
The two conditions for the second proposal are as follows:
Control: Proposal 2 would implement certain testing methods for job applicants,
restrict the number of finalists for a particular job or position, place limits on
the hiring of temporary workers, and require that applicants be residents of the
state.
Treatment: Proposal 2 would spur job growth for state residents by im-
plementing certain testing methods for job applicants, restricting the number of
finalists for a particular job or position, placing limits on the hiring of temporary
workers, and requiring that applicants be residents of the state.
Respondents were shown both proposals and in different conditions. If they saw the first pro-
posal in the control condition, they saw the second in the treatment condition, and vice versa.
Dependent Variables
Above I explain that clear policy goals should make ballot measures seem less complex
and should provide citizens stronger issue attitudes. These mediating effects help to explain
the findings I present Study 1. Study 2’s dependent variables reflect these expectations:
Attitude Strength: For each proposal, respondents reported whether they would sup-
port or oppose its passage on a 7-point scale. Following this, they were asked three ques-
tions about their certainty and confidence regarding that opinion (McGraw, Hasecke &
Conger 2003, Tormala & Rucker 2007, Gerber, Huber, Doherty & Dowling 2011). Each item
is measured on a 5-point scale, and higher values indicate greater certainty and confidence.
The attitude strength variable is each respondent’s factor score derived from their answers
to the three items:10
10The Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is 0.82.
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• How certain are you of your attitude on the ballot proposal that you just provided?
• How certain are you that your attitude on this ballot proposal is the right attitude to
have?
• How confident are you that you have the knowledge and expertise to evaluate this
ballot proposal?
Perceived Complexity: Perceived complexity is measured as responses on a 5-point
scale to the following question: “How complex do you find the policy issue in this ballot
proposal to be?” Higher values indicate greater perceived complexity.
Independent Variables
Study 2 relies on random assignment to precisely measure the effects of clearer goals in
the text of ballot measures. It also relies on perceived goal clarity as a predictor of the two
dependent variables discussed immediately above:
Condition: For the experimental portion of the analyses below, experimental condition
is measured as a dichotomous variable indicating whether the proposal was seen in the con-
trol condition (0) or the goal clarity treatment condition (1).
Perceived Goal Clarity: For the observational portion of the analyses below, the main
independent variable is how clearly respondents perceive the policy goals of the proposal to
be. On a 5-point scale, respondents answered the following question for each proposal they
read: “How clear is it to you what the policy goals of this ballot proposal are?” Higher
values indicate greater clarity.
Perceived Problem Clarity: To ensure that respondents were specifically considering
goal clarity in the question above, and not other forms of clarity, they were asked to report
how clearly they perceived the problems being addressed by the proposal on the same 5-point
scale: “How clear is it to you what problems this ballot proposal is trying to address?” This
question appeared before the perceived goal clarity question for each proposal.
Perceived Policy Change Clarity: As an additional assurance that respondents con-
sidered goal clarity in the question above, they were also asked to report how clearly they
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perceived the policy changes involved with the proposal: “How clear is it to you what changes
in policy will occur if this ballot proposal is passed?” They were asked this question after the
perceived goal clarity question. Policy change clarity and problem clarity are both included
as controls in the models below to test whether perceived goal clarity has the predicted
effects over and above these other two forms of clarity.
Sophistication: Political sophistication is a factor score derived from responses to 11
political interest questions and 6 political knowledge questions.11
Study 2: Results
H4 and H5 predict that as the policy goals of reform are perceived to be clearer, voters will
gain stronger attitudes about reform and will perceive reform to be less complex, respectively.
Table 2.4 contains evidence in support of both hypotheses. Both models pool the four ballot
proposals that each respondent read during the course of the study, and I include random
effects for respondents and dummy variables for the 16 proposals that they could have been
shown. The dependent variable in the model on the left is the attitude strength scale
constructed from the three items measuring certainty. The dependent variable in the model
on the right is the five-item perception of complexity scale. Both models are OLS, and all
variables have been scaled 0-1.
In both models, the coefficient on perceived goal clarity is statistically significant and in
the expected direction: perceiving the goals of reform to be clear increases attitude strength
and decreases how complex the reform seems. Along with a control for political sophis-
tication, both models also include measures of how clearly the underlying problem being
11The interest questions asked respondents how closely they follow politics, how important the results of
the 2018 election are to them, whether they participated in a political cause or campaign in the previous
12 months, and how often they engaged in the following activities: discussed politics with family, discussed
politics with friends, discussed politics via social media, clicked on a Facebook link about politics, clicked on
a Twitter link about politics, watched a television program about politics, listened to a radio program about
politics, and visited a news website to read about politics. The knowledge questions asked respondents
to identify: the current U.S. Secretary of Energy, a constitutional power of the U.S. Vice President, the
proportion of members required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto, the job
or office held by John Kelly (as of September 2017), the correct description of Medicare, and the correct
description of the Byrd Rule. The Cronbach’s alpha of these 11 items is 0.80.
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Table 2.4: Perceived goal clarity makes issue attitudes stronger and makes reform seem less complex.
(1) (2)
Attitude Strength Perceived Complexity
Perceived Goal Clarity 0.12∗ (0.02) -0.08∗ (0.03)
Perceived Problem Clarity 0.10∗ (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Perceived Policy Change Clarity 0.14∗ (0.02) -0.15∗ (0.03)
Sophistication 0.13∗ (0.03) 0.06 (0.04)
Constant 0.14∗ (0.03) 0.50∗ (0.03)
Proposal Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Within R2 0.37 0.24
Between R2 0.25 0.05
Overall R2 0.32 0.17
Observations 1,429 1,434
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
Both models are OLS with random effects for individual respondents. All variables are coded 0-1. On the left, the dependent
variable is the attitude strength scale constructed from the three attitude certainty items. On the right, the dependent variable
is the five-item perceived complexity scale.
addressed by the reform is perceived and the perceived clarity of the policy changes that
would occur. The inclusion of these controls suggests that goal clarity, as expected, operates
independently of those other forms of clarity.12 Substantively, moving from the lowest to the
highest levels of perceived goal clarity pushes respondents 12% of the way up the attitude
strength scale and 8% of the way down the perceived complexity scale.
Turning from the observational to the experimental analyses, I first test whether the goal
clarity manipulation worked as intended. The expectation is that compared to respondents
in the control condition, respondents in the treatment condition should perceive the goals
of reform to be clearer. They should also perceive the underlying problem being addressed
by the proposal to be clearer because of the close association between goals and problems.
There should be no difference in how clear the policy changes of the proposal seem, since that
is left unaffected by the experimental manipulation. Finally, respondents in the treatment
condition should perceive reform to be less complex compared to respondents in the control
12I include a correlation matrix and VIFs of the three perceived clarity measures in Appendix 2A to
demonstrate their independence. The correlations are moderately positive and the VIF scores are well below
10.
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condition.
Table 2.5 tests each of these expectations through a series of OLS models featuring just a
single independent variable: a dummy variable set to 1 for the treatment condition and to 0
for the control condition. As expected, the coefficient on the dummy variable is positive and
significant in the first two models, suggesting that the manipulation made the policy goals
and the underlying problem in the proposals seem clearer. Also as expected, the coefficient
on the dummy variable in the third model is zero. This means that the manipulation had
no effect on how clearly the policy changes were perceived. Finally, the coefficient on the
treatment dummy is positive and not significant in the fourth model. This fails to support
my expectation, since it suggests that the manipulation had no effect on how complex the
ballot proposal seemed to respondents.13
Table 2.5: Experimental manipulation worked as intended for three out of the four dependent variables: goal clarity, problem
clarity, and policy change clarity, but not perceived complexity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goal Clarity Problem Clarity Policy Change Clarity Perceived Complexity
Treatment Condition 0.08∗ (0.02) 0.10∗ (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Constant 0.51∗ (0.02) 0.45∗ (0.02) 0.49∗ (0.02) 0.50∗ (0.02)
Within R2 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00
Between R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall R2 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00
Observations 733 731 734 733
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
All models are OLS with random effects for individual respondents. Each of the dependent variables is coded 0-1. From left
to right, the dependent variables are perceived goal clarity, perceived problem clarity, perceived policy change clarity, and
perceived complexity.
I employ this same model to test whether the goal clarity treatment condition made re-
spondents’ attitudes about reform stronger. Table 2.6 contains the results, and they provide
mixed support for my expectations. When the two ballot proposals that were subject to
experimental manipulation are pooled together, there is no effect of the treatment condition
on attitude strength (p=.18). When separated by proposal, there is the expected effect only
13The treatment effect on perceived goal clarity and perceived problem clarity is robust across both
topics. Table 2.13 in Appendix 2A contains regression results where the debt limit and job creation topics
are modeled separately.
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for the debt limit ballot proposal: respondents in the goal clarity treatment condition re-
ported stronger issue attitudes than respondents in the control condition (p=.07). There is
no equivalent effect for the job creation ballot proposal. Substantively, the effect on the debt
limit proposal is modest: moving from the control to the goal clarity treatment condition
moves respondents 4% of the way up the attitude strength scale.14
Table 2.6: Goal clarity treatment inconsistently makes attitudes stronger.
(1) (2) (3)
Attitude Strength Attitude Strength Attitude Strength
Treatment Condition 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
Constant 0.43∗ (0.01) 0.42∗ (0.01) 0.44∗ (0.01)
Respondent Random Effects Yes No No
Topic Both (pooled) Debt Limit Job Creation
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 0.00
Observations 731 366 365
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
All models are OLS. The dependent variable is coded 0-1. The first model pools both of the ballot proposals that were subject
to experimental manipulation with random effects for individual respondents. The second and third models separate the debt
limit proposal from the job creation proposal. The value reported for Adjusted R2 in the first model is the within-subjects R2.
Discussion and Conclusion
Clearly conveyed policy goals facilitate voters’ engagement in direct democracy. Clear
goals make voters’ attitudes about ballot measures stronger, which leads citizens to vote on
measures instead of abstaining. Clear goals also increase support for reform when the policy
goal is agreeable across political divisions. When the policy goals are ideological, they help
voters align their opinions on the ballot measure with their political predispositions.
My findings also suggest that clear policy goals make otherwise complex ballot measures
more understandable. Previous research has demonstrated that group cues (and particularly
partisan cues) help citizens determine their issue positions (Lenz 2012), often by clarifying
14I investigate the reason for the contrasting effects between the debt limit and job creation proposal in
models and figures in Appendix 2A. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 and Tables 2.14 and 2.15 suggest that the goal
clarity treatment condition made respondents more likely to see the debt limit proposal as partisan and
Republican, as expected. By contrast, the treatment made respondents less likely to see the jobs creation
proposal as partisan. One reason is that the language of restrictions and priorities for in-state residents might
have made respondents think that it was a Republican proposal in the control condition, but the addition of
the jobs creation goal in the treatment condition provided a countervailing signal. That would explain the
results in the right-hand figure in Figure 2.4, in which the treatment condition made respondents less likely
to see the proposal as endorsed by Republicans, and this effect was more pronounced for sophisticates than
non-sophisticates.
52
which positions align with people’s deeper political commitments (Lupia 1994). Clear policy
goals serve a similar function, since they help citizens connect specific policy decisions to
broader political conflicts. They also provide citizens confidence in their resulting opinions,
which gives them the motivation to vote on the measure. Thus, clearly conveyed policy goals
are central to direct democracy efforts and serve as a key piece of information that can buoy
or sink a measure’s passage.
My theory pushes our understanding of complexity and political behavior beyond ty-
pologies of the issues themselves, such as classifying issues as easy or hard (Carmines &
Stimson 1980). Hard issues may be seen as more complex and invite less participation than
easy issues. All the same, hard and easy issues themselves will be seen as more or less com-
plex depending on how the issue is presented. Researchers should give more attention to how
issues are conveyed when explaining why citizens become politically engaged or disengaged,
since both issue presentation and issue characteristics matter for issue participation.
This study has focused on goal clarity in the specific context of direct democracy. Ballot
measures provide an optimal setting to test a theory of information and political behavior.
When citizens vote for candidates, their issue positions compete with other factors like the
candidate’s perceived competence and personality to guide their vote choice. By contrast,
citizens’ decisions about direct democracy legislation more fully reflect their considered issue
positions. Further, we know the precise language of the measure that is presented to voters
on the ballot, so findings about ballot information’s causal effects have a high degree of
internal validity relative to the typical media priming study, which assumes that every voter
in a media market is being exposed to the same messages. Studying real ballot measures
also provides greater external validity than most survey experimental framing studies, since
we have more confidence that results reflect real voter behavior.
All the same, my findings about the behavioral effects of clear policy goals can extend
further than whether and how citizens vote on ballot measures. Discussion of goals feature
prominently in policy reform debates. Political elites in favor of reform focus centrally on
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goals when debating issue reform, particularly when the goals of reform are generally agree-
able across political lines (e.g. lowering heath care premiums, protecting natural resources).
Indeed, their focus on goals can crowd out discussion of other, complicating aspects of the
policy change (Tyner 2016). Elites opposing reform want to focus on everything except its
goals, so that voters think foremost about the costs and unintended consequences of reform
and not its agreeable aspects.
The results I present above suggest that their strategies are warranted. Focusing narrowly
on the goals of reform simplifies the decision that citizens have to make about a policy reform
proposal. Rather than weighing all the costs and benefits that reform presents, citizens need
only consider whether they support or oppose the underlying policy goal when that becomes
the dominant idea in a debate. Because approving or disapproving of a policy goal is a
relatively easy decision for citizens to make, they can use that heuristic to develop a position
and gain confidence in it, both of which are requisite to taking political action on the issue
(Peterson 2005, Tormala & Petty 2004). By contrast, when complicating considerations like
costs, unintended consequences, and procedural concerns occupy a larger share of an issue
debate relative to policy goals, citizens should find it more difficult to maintain strong issue
attitudes. We should thus expect greater citizen participation to follow from issue debates
that feature a greater focus on policy goals.
To mobilize support, political elites need to focus public attention on the aspects of an
issue that cut through citizens’ disinterest in political affairs. One way to accomplish this is
by keeping the goals of issue reform front and center, minimizing the time that voters spend
thinking about other aspects of issue reform. Focusing on policy goals reminds people why
they should care about reform in the first place – namely, because the world can be made
better through the political system. Until voters believe that this is possible, they will stay
on the sidelines of issue reform efforts.
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Complex Political Debates,
Attitude Strength, and Political Action
Scholarly consensus holds that citizens are, on the whole, politically disengaged and
largely disinterested in public policy matters. Despite this, the mass public does become
relatively more engaged on some issues some of the time by sustaining attention to an issue
and communicating their preferences to policymakers. Their uneven interest and attention
raises an important question: what determines whether citizens become politically involved
in a specific issue?
An issue’s perceived complexity should shape whether citizens participate politically in
efforts to reform it. Complexity undermines citizens’ political engagement by decreasing
citizens’ certainty about their issue attitudes. Decreased certainty heightens citizens’ risk
aversion and status quo bias, which, in turn, cause political de-mobilization. Citizens thus
become less willing to take action on beliefs that they do not feel conviction about. When
status quo problems and their solutions are seen as too complex to meddle with, citizens
lose both the desire for political reform and the willingness to take action to achieve it. In
this way, the complexity of issue debates provides a causal mechanism that helps explain the
widely held view of a status quo bias in representative democracy.
This theory suggests that elites can influence citizens’ involvement by the complexity
with which they discuss political issues. While problems can be widely recognized and
agreed upon – poverty, crime, international conflict, and a lagging economy, for example
– diagnosing the root causes, identifying the responsible actors, and proposing the correct
solutions opens up a world of disagreement and debate in which the right lever to pull to
solve the problem is rarely obvious. This opens the door for elites to undermine citizens’
confidence in reform along any of these dimensions. When citizens lose confidence in the
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solutions presented to them, they also lose faith that anything can or should be done to
address the problem.
In this paper, I establish a connection between the complexity of an issue debate and
citizens’ mobilization by focusing on the three stages of the causal process: the effect of com-
plexity on the consistency of citizens’ issue considerations, the effect of those considerations
on attitude strength, and the effect of attitude strength on political action. Specifically, I
develop and test the hypothesis that, as a general matter, complex presentations of issues
should weaken attitudes because they prompt less consistent ideas about the issue. Weaker
attitudes should predict decreased willingness to take political action. However, a small but
important segment of the population might have a different response to complexity. For peo-
ple at the highest levels of sophistication, complexity might strengthen attitudes, since they
can respond to the increased volume of information in a complex debate by counterarguing
incongruent information and reinforcing their existing attitudes.
I find support my expectations in two original survey experiments. Since attitude strength
is a prerequisite to taking political action on an issue, understanding how political commu-
nication influences attitude strength helps us understand political behavior (Peterson 2005).
More broadly, identifying the effect that complexity in the information environment has
on political mobilization helps us understand the circumstances under which political elites
might strategically use complex rhetoric for political gain.
Complexity of Issue Presentations
On any given political issue, the underlying problem that currently exists and the goals of
political reform may be well understood. Even so, the effectiveness of proposed reforms,
the many intended and unintended consequences of changing the system, the severity of the
underlying problem, and the procedural and policy precedents that might be set by adopting
the proposed solution can remain matters of dispute. The inability to predict all of the many
consequences of changing the status quo raises uncertainty for citizens, which, as explained
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below, leads them to disengage from political reform efforts.
In line with this, a complex presentation of an issue is distinguished from a simple pre-
sentation by the introduction of a wider range of distinct arguments. Where a simple presen-
tation might raise one or two main arguments for being for or against a proposal, a complex
presentation will bring up a greater number of arguments and spread attention across many
different dimensions of the issue. Accordingly, increasing the complexity of an issue is defined
here as increasing the dimensionality of the issue debate (Jones, Talbert & Potoski 2003).
Complexity, Issue Considerations, and Attitude Strength
Complexity can decrease attitude strength by simultaneously supplying positive and nega-
tive ideas about an issue. There are three reasons we should expect this relationship. First,
the literature on objective ambivalence has found that holding positive and negative ideas
about an object at the same time can diminish attitude certainty (McGraw, Hasecke &
Conger 2003). When new information consistently points in the same evaluative direction
(either positive or negative), uncertainty decreases. But when new information points in
different directions (positive and negative), uncertainty increases (Petty & Krosnick 2014).
The competing ideas communicated in complex issue presentations should prompt objec-
tive ambivalence by providing citizens conflicting ideas about the issue (Zaller & Feldman
1992). Weighing many distinct considerations about an attitude object makes it difficult to
evaluate the object wholly positively or negatively. The resulting judgments, in turn, should
be held with less confidence (Barker & Hansen 2005).
Second, the high volume of information conveyed by complex issue presentations should
make it difficult to counterargue any conflicting considerations. Whether citizens emerge
from an issue debate with consistent or inconsistent considerations depends on their reac-
tions to the arguments they are exposed to. Having wholly positive reactions to one side’s
arguments and negative reactions to the other should leave citizens with consistent consid-
erations and thus increase citizens’ attitude certainty. Conversely, having mixed reactions
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to a debate’s arguments – either by thinking both side’s arguments are persuasive or unper-
suasive – should diminish certainty.
Complex rhetoric that presents a wide range of arguments makes it difficult to maintain
consistent reactions. Each new argument presents an opportunity for inconsistency – either
by finding the side that one normally favors unpersuasive or by finding the other side un-
usually persuasive. If a citizen is fairly evaluating incoming arguments, the probability of
consistently favoring one side’s arguments and opposing those of the other side should de-
crease with each additional argument added to the debate. An individual might be able to
successfully counterargue a small number of conflicting ideas, but the high volume presented
in complex issue presentations should make that task difficult.
Finally, beyond its effect on conflicting considerations and citizens’ capacity to counter-
argue them, complex rhetoric can decrease attitude certainty in a third way. Rather than
considering all of the positive and negative aspects of an object introduced by new infor-
mation, some citizens might respond by giving up on the judgment task and recognizing
the limitations of their own understanding of the political issue. The Dunning-Kruger effect
in social psychology refers to a similar process, wherein people’s confidence in their own
abilities at a given task decreases as their abilities improve (Kruger & Dunning 1999). The
explanation for this phenomenon is that increasing someone’s competency at a task increases
their ability to recognize the difference between a good performance and a bad performance.
This allows people to more accurately discern their own capacities and limitations.
A related mechanism should be at play in political judgments. Individuals should express
more confidence in their attitudes when they are unaware of the complexity of whatever it
is they are expressing an attitude about. It is only when they learn (or are reminded) of
this complexity that they recognize the breadth of what they do not know. Correspondingly,
individuals should express less confidence in their resulting opinions.
Complexity should thus lower citizens’ confidence in their political judgments. This
should manifest as both lower self-reported certainty as well as less extreme issue positions.
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Attitude extremity and certainty are two distinct measures of attitude strength (Visser,
Krosnick & Simmons 2003), but they should be related to the extent that feeling a lack of
confidence about one’s issue attitude should turn people away from expressing an extreme
position. Complex presentations of issues should therefore also decrease attitude extremity,
in addition to decreasing attitude certainty as discussed above. Given their close association,
I analyze the two concepts through a single scale below.1
The Conditional Effect of Complexity
Not all citizens attempt to evaluate incoming ideas fairly (Taber & Lodge 2006). Many citi-
zens are motivated to maintain their existing beliefs, and thus they respond to new informa-
tion by weighing agreeable arguments more favorably than disagreeable ones. The capacity
and motivation to engage in this kind of motivated reasoning is unevenly distributed across
the population. Citizens with greater political interest and knowledge should be better able
to recognize arguments that conflict with their existing issue attitudes and more motivated
to counterargue them. Thus for citizens who are motivated to maintain their belief systems,
the volume of incoming political arguments might not matter – they should successfully
counter incongruent ideas and incorporate the ideas that conform to their existing opinions.
Accordingly, the effects of complexity should depend on citizens’ capacity and motivation
to counterargue incoming information. Based on the theory outlined in the sections above,
those who cannot counterargue should develop weaker attitudes. For those who can coun-
terargue incongruent arguments, complex rhetoric should strengthen their issue attitudes.
Individuals’ attitudes strengthen when they perceive that they have resisted strong coun-
terarguments (Tormala & Rucker 2007). In the context of attitude certainty, research build-
ing on the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) has found that resisting counterarguments
leads to greater attitude certainty when elaboration is high – that is, when a great deal of ac-
tive thought has gone into resisting the counterarguments (Tormala & Petty 2004). Further,
1I report measures of association below demonstrating that the two concepts form a reliable scale.
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previous work has demonstrated a “boomerang effect,” whereby exposure to countervailing
information leads attitudes in the opposite direction, especially among citizens who have
strong prior attitudes and are able and motivated to protect them (Levendusky 2013, Taber
& Lodge 2006). All of this suggests that citizens who resist incoming incongruent arguments
should gain stronger attitudes following exposure to complex rhetoric.
Attitude Strength and Political Participation
Previous work in both political science (Peterson 2005) and psychology (Visser, Krosnick &
Simmons 2003, Tormala & Petty 2004) suggests a link among attitude certainty, attitude
extremity, and attitude-behavior consistency. As attitudes become more certain and more
extreme, individuals become more likely to act on them. Political action requires invest-
ments of both time and material resources. People should only be willing to expend these
scarce resources when their confidence that they have the right opinion on the issue is high.
Therefore, I expect weaker issue attitudes should predict less willingness to take political
action on the issue.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the theory I present above. Complex issue presentations intro-
duce a wide range of arguments that raise positive and negative aspects of reform proposals.
Whether the arguments leave citizens with consistent or inconsistent issue considerations
depends on citizens’ motivation and capacity to counterargue incongruent ideas. Both of
these characteristics vary systematically with political sophistication. When citizens are left
with conflicting issue considerations, their issue attitudes should weaken. By contrast, when
citizens resist incongruent ideas, their issue attitudes should strengthen. Attitude strength,
in turn, affects willingness to take action on the issue. In this way, complex issue presenta-
tions stratify the public – those who are equipped to process complex rhetoric should become
more likely to participate, and those who are not should disengage from the political issue.
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Figure 3.1: Theory of Complex Issue Presentations
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Hypotheses
Each step of the causal process I outline above leads to a separate hypothesis:
• H1: As political sophistication increases, citizens should be better able to counterargue
incongruent political information.
• H2: Among individuals unable to counterargue incongruent information, complex issue
debates should prompt inconsistent reactions.
• H3: Inconsistent reactions to an issue debate should weaken citizens’ attitudes.
• H4: Among individuals unable to counterargue incongruent information, complex-
ity should weaken attitudes. Among those are able to counterargue, complexity will
strengthen attitudes.
• H5: Weaker attitudes should make citizens less willing to take action on an issue.
Study 1: Design
I test these hypotheses with two original survey experiments. Each exposes respondents to
hypothetical issue reforms and arguments made in support or opposition. In the complex
debate condition, respondents are supplied a greater number of randomly drawn arguments
than respondents in the simple debate condition. By randomizing the specific arguments
that each respondent receives about a reform proposal, we can be more confident that any
consequences arise from the volume and not the specific content of information.
The first survey was administered to a convenience sample of 350 undergraduate students
in an Introduction to American Politics class, yielding 301 respondents. Each respondent
received two separate issue presentations, each of which represented a different, randomly
assigned experimental condition. In the complex condition, respondents were provided with
eight arguments in total about the reform proposal – four arguments that bolster the sup-
porters’ position and four that bolster the opponents’ position. In the simple condition,
respondents were provided with two arguments in total, one that should support the sup-
porters’ position and one that should support the opponents’ position. Because the central
purpose of this study is to test the effects of complex versus simple issue presentations, the
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randomization was skewed so that 40% of the issue presentations were in the complex con-
dition, 40% were in the simple condition, and 20% were in a condition with no arguments.
Each respondent was randomly assigned to two of the three conditions through the course
of the survey.
The two issue reforms were a proposal to raise the minimum wage in an unnamed nearby
state to $12.00 per hour and a proposal to grant federal authorities greater access to citizens’
cell phone data in order to combat domestic terrorism. These reform proposals represent
traditional concerns of the left and right, helping to ensure that the results are not particular
to liberal or conservative proposals. Both issues are also familiar enough to be of interest
to respondents while not being so salient or polarized that variation in certainty becomes
difficult to induce (as might be the case with an issue like gun control).
In each block of questions, respondents were first given a brief summary of the proposed
bill. Following this, they were informed that: “On the following pages, you will read ar-
guments that were made in support or opposition to this bill. For each argument, please
indicate whether or you think the argument was made by the bill’s supporters or the bill’s
opponents and rate how persuasive you think the argument is.” Respondents were then
shown unique one- or two-sentence arguments and asked to categorize them as supporter or
opponent arguments.2 The order and content of arguments is fully randomized, and each
argument is drawn from a list of 8 supporter and 8 opponent arguments that were tailored
to the specific issue. In the simple condition, one argument was pulled from the supporter
list and one from the opponent list. In the complex condition, four arguments were pulled
from the supporter list and four from the opponent list. Respondents in the no argument
condition proceeded to the issue opinion questions without any intervening arguments. The
full lists of possible supporter and opponent arguments are found in Appendix 3A.
Following the presentation and categorization of arguments, respondents were asked to
2The purpose of this exercise was to induce respondents’ focus on the arguments, though I explain below
that their answers are also used to measure a moderator in my theory.
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rate their level of support or opposition to the bill on a 7-point scale. This 7-point scale
was folded to produce a 4-point opinion extremity scale for the analyses below. Respondents
were then asked to provide their level of certainty about their opinion on the bill on a 5-
point unipolar scale from ‘extremely certain’ to ‘not at all certain.’ As a second measure of
certainty, respondents were asked, “Do you feel you know enough about the issue to make an
informed decision about it?” Finally, issue importance was assessed by asking respondents
how important the underlying political issue is on a 5-point scale.
Political action was measured with three questions assessing respondents’ willingness to
get involved. Respondents were asked how likely they would be to donate money to an
organization that shared their position on the bill, how likely they would be to volunteer for
an organization that shared their position on the bill, and how likely they would be to sign
a petition declaring their position on the bill.
The two blocks of issue questions were preceded by a block of questions measuring politi-
cal sophistication and were followed for each respondent with a block of questions measuring
demographic characteristics and identifications, including race, gender, party identification,
and self-reported ideology.
Study 2: Design
Study 2 builds on Study 1 by parsing out attitude certainty into greater detail and incorpo-
rating additional measures of political action. Further, it expands the number of issues on
the instrument to four. The additional issues are a proposal to double the number of charter
schools in the state in which the survey was administered and a federal proposal to triple
the amount of grant funding available for research into wind power. The list of supporter
and opponent arguments for the two new issue areas are contained in Appendix 3A.
Study 2 splits one of the measures of attitude certainty from Study 1 (asking respondents
to report their level of certainty about their issue opinion) into two separate questions: one
measuring how clear respondents’ opinion on each bill is in their own minds, and one mea-
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suring how certain they are that that opinion is the correct one to have (Petrocelli, Tormala
& Rucker 2007). It also adds an additional measure of certainty assessing respondents’ con-
fidence that they have the knowledge and expertise to evaluate policy in that specific issue
area (Gerber, Huber, Doherty & Dowling 2011).
Finally, Study 2 adds two new measures of political action: a question asking respondents
how likely they would be to share their opinion on the bill with interested friends and family,
and how support for their representative (state or member of Congress, depending on the
issue) would change based on the representative’s support or opposition to the bill. The
breadth of actions measured in Study 2 should shed additional light on how the complexity
of political debate affects citizens’ willingness to take action on political issues. Finally,
Study 2 improves on Study 1 by including additional, harder questions measuring political
sophistication. The measure of political sophistication used in Study 1 is skewed toward
higher values on the scale. Additional sophistication questions help address this limitation.
Variables
Dependent Variable
• Argument Rating Difference (ARD): the absolute difference between the average
supporters’ argument ratings and the average opponents’ argument ratings, which is
then rescaled from 0-1. Persuasiveness ratings can be rated as 1, 2, or 3. Because there
are only two arguments in the simple condition, the variable can take on values of 0,
0.5, and 1. In the complex condition, it can take on values of 0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375...1.
Regardless of condition, higher values of ARD indicate more consistent reactions to
the arguments. A score of 0 means the supporters’ arguments are considered equally
persuasive as the opponents’ arguments on average. A score of 1 indicates that one
side’s arguments are seen as fully persuasive and the other side’s as fully unpersuasive.
As such, low scores reflect conflicting reactions to a debate, while high scores reflect
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reactions that are in harmony.3
• Attitude Strength: a factor score generated from three items in Study 1 and five
items in Study 2. It is scaled 0-1.
– In Study 1, the items are: a 5-point scale measuring how certain respondents
feel about their issue attitude; a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not
respondents felt they knew enough about the issue to have an informed opinion
about it; and an opinion extremity scale, taking the value of 0 if the respondent
neither supported nor opposed the issue reform, up to 3 if the respondent either
strongly supported or strongly opposed the issue reform.4
– In Study 2, the items are: a 5-point scale measuring how certain respondents
were that they knew their own opinion on the issue; a 5-point scale measuring
how certain respondents were that they had the correct opinion on the issue;
a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not respondents felt they knew
enough about the issue to have an informed opinion about it; a dichotomous
variable measuring whether or not the respondent felt confident about evaluating
policy in the issue area; and an opinion extremity scale, taking the value of 0 if
the respondent neither supported nor opposed the issue reform, up to 3 if the
respondent either strongly supported or strongly opposed the issue reform.5
• Political Action: Political action is measured through multiple items, some of which
are included exclusively in Study 1, some exclusively in Study 2, and some in both:
– Donate: a 5-point scale measuring how likely a respondent is to donate to an
organization taking action on the issue. It is scaled 0-1.
3Though listed as dependent variables, both ARD and attitude strength function as dependent and
independent variables in the models below. This reflects the hypotheses above.
4Cronbach alpha values for the two attitude strength variables from Study 1 are as follows: minimum
wage = 0.69; cell phone data = 0.70.
5Cronbach alpha values for the four attitude strength variables from Study 2 are as follows: minimum
wage = 0.82; cell phone data = 0.81; charter schools = 0.85; wind power = 0.87.
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– Volunteer : a 5-point scale measuring how likely a respondent is to volunteer for
an organization taking action on the issue. It is scaled 0-1.
– Petition (Study 1 Only): a 5-point scale measuring how likely a respondent is to
sign a petition declaring their position on the issue. It is scaled 0-1.
– Share (Study 2 Only): a 5-point scale measuring how likely a respondent is to
share their opinion on this bill with friends or family members who might be
interested. It is scaled 0-1.
– Vote (Study 2 Only): a 5-point scale measuring how likely a respondent is to
vote for/against their respective legislator (either state representative or member
of Congress, depending on the issue) based on their support or opposition to the
reform bill. It is scaled 0-1.
– Action: an average of the particular political action questions each respondent
answered (Donate, Volunteer, and Petition for Study 1 participants; Donate, Vol-
unteer, Share, and Vote for Study 2 participants).
Independent Variables
• Complexity: a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was in the com-
plex condition (1) or the simple condition (0). In the complex condition, respondents
were exposed to eight arguments about an issue proposal (four supporting reform and
four opposing reform), which they were asked to classify as belonging to supporters
or opponents and rank on a 1-3 argument strength scale. In the simple condition,
respondents were exposed to two arguments (one supporting reform and one opposing
reform) and similarly asked to report the argument’s strength.
• Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI): the proportion of arguments that respon-
dents correctly identified as belonging to supporters or opponents. Because there are
only two arguments in the simple condition, this variable can take on values of 0, 0.5,
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or 1 in that condition. There are eight arguments in the complex condition, so the
variable can take on values of 0, 0.125, 0.25, ...1. PCI assesses how well respondents
figured out which arguments were on each side of the issue. Since respondents need
to understand which side is responsible for which arguments in order to counterargue
incongruent ideas, PCI is used as a measure of respondents’ counterarguing capacity.
To be sure, the capacity to counterargue incongruent information is distinct from ac-
tually doing so. As such, this measure only approximates respondents’ counterarguing
activity and does not measure it directly.
• Sophistication: a factor score derived from a scale of four political knowledge and
four political participation items in Study 1 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59) and six political
knowledge and six political participation items in Study 2 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79).
The Study 1 scores are left-skewed. The scores in Study 2 are more evenly distributed
across the possible values. This variable is scaled from 0-1.
• Folded Party Identification: a 4-point scale derived from folding a 7-point measure
of party identification on its midpoint. Higher values indicate more extreme partisan-
ship. As such, this variable serves as a control for partisan strength.
• Folded Ideology: a 4-point scale derived from folding a 7-point measure of ideology
on its midpoint. Higher values indicate a more extreme ideology.
Before proceeding, it is worth providing additional validity to the ARD measure discussed
earlier in this section. I use ARD to measure how consistently individuals respond to the
arguments they read. Higher values indicate greater consistency, and thus fewer conflicting
considerations about the issue. If this is the case, we should find that political sophisticates
– who are more motivated to maintain consistent considerations – should have higher values
on the ARD scale than non-sophisticates. Further, we should find that correctly identifying
which side of the debate made which argument should have a stronger effect on ARD as
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sophistication increases. This is because it is sophisticates who are motivated to counter in-
congruent arguments, so they should use their understanding of arguments’ sources to more
effectively maintain consistent considerations about the issue.
I test these propositions with two models in Table 3.1. The first regresses ARD on sophis-
tication. The second regresses ARD on sophistication, the proportion of correctly identified
arguments, and an interaction of the two. The results support expectations and thus provide
confidence in the validity of the ARD measure. The first model demonstrates that sophis-
ticates, as expected, maintain more consistent reactions to issue debates. Figure 3.2 plots
the marginal effect of correctly identifying the two sides’ arguments on ARD across levels of
sophistication, using estimates from the second model in Table 3.1. For non-sophisticates,
moving from correctly identifying none of the arguments to correctly identifying all of the
arguments has no effect on ARD. For sophisticates, by contrast, the effect of correctly iden-
tifying all of the arguments versus none of the arguments is a strong increase in ARD.
Table 3.1: Political sophisticates maintain more consistent reactions to issue debates.
(1) (2)
ARD ARD
Sophistication 0.14∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.41 (0.26)
Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI) -0.09 (0.14)
Sophistication × PCI 0.57∗ (0.28)
Constant 0.23∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.32∗ (0.13)
Study Pooled Pooled
Within-R2 · 0.01
Between-R2 0.03 0.05
Overall-R2 0.01 0.03
Observations 1,162 1,162
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
Both models are OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent. All inde-
pendent and dependent variables are coded 0-1.
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Marginal effects derived from the second model in Table 3.1.
Results
H1 predicts that the ability to counterargue incongruent political information should
increase with political sophistication. As I explain above, I operationalize the ability to
counterargue as the proportion of arguments that respondents correctly classify as belong-
ing to supporters or opponents of the reform proposal. I regress this measure on political
sophistication. In this model and hereafter, I estimate each model with OLS. I include ran-
dom effects for respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent to account for any
clustering, since each respondent answered questions about more than one reform proposal.
The results in Table 3.2 support expectations. The coefficient on sophistication in the
pooled model – which combines respondents from Study 1 and Study 2 – is positive and
statistically significant, indicating that relative to non-sophisticates, political sophisticates
are better able to classify arguments, and thus better equipped to counter the arguments
that are incongruent with their existing beliefs. Substantively, moving from the lowest to
the highest level of political sophistication in the pooled model moves respondents 8% of the
way up the scale that measures counterarguing capacity. The results are largely consistent
when broken out into Study 1 and Study 2.
The expectation in H2 is that respondents who can successfully counterargue incongruent
information should have more consistent reactions to complex issue debates. The dependent
variable, as explained above, is operationalized by the absolute difference between the av-
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Table 3.2: Political sophisticates are better able to counterargue incongruent political information.
(1) (2) (3)
PCI PCI PCI
Sophistication 0.08∗∗ (0.03) 0.08+ (0.04) 0.11∗∗ (0.04)
Constant 0.89∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.88∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.88∗∗∗ (0.02)
Study Pooled Study 1 Study 2
Within-R2 · · ·
Between-R2 0.02 0.01 0.03
Overall-R2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Observations 1,162 468 694
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
The dependent variable (PCI) is the proportion of arguments that respondents correctly identified. The model is estimated
with OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent. Both the independent
and dependent variables are scaled 0-1.
erage persuasiveness assigned to supporters’ arguments and opponents’ arguments (ARD
hereafter). To test H2, I first regress ARD on the experimental condition dummy by itself
to determine the average treatment effect. I then regress ARD on the condition dummy, the
proportion of correctly identified arguments (PCI), and an interaction between those two
predictors. Table 3.3 contains the regression estimates and Figure 3.3 plots the marginal
effect of the complex treatment condition across levels of PCI. Table 3.9 in Appendix 3B
separates respondents by study, and the results are nearly equivalent.
Table 3.3: The effect of complexity on ARD weakens as the proportion of arguments correctly identified (PCI) increases.
(1) (2)
ARD ARD
Complex Condition -0.10∗∗∗ (0.02) -0.32∗∗∗ (0.08)
Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI) 0.07 (0.07)
Complexity × PCI 0.24∗∗ (0.09)
Constant 0.35∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.07)
Study Pooled Pooled
Within-R2 0.04 0.06
Between-R2 0.02 0.03
Overall-R2 0.03 0.04
Observations 1,182 1,182
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
Both models are OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent. All inde-
pendent and dependent variables are coded 0-1. Equivalent models with respondents separated by study are contained in Table
3.9 in Appendix 3B. The results are largely consistent with what is shown here.
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Marginal effects derived from the second model in Table 3.3.
Averaged across all respondents, complexity has a negative and statistically significant
effect on ARD. Substantively, moving from the simple to the complex debate condition moves
respondents’ ARD scores 10% down that scale. The marginal effects in Figure 3.3 provide
additional support for my expectations. Across all levels of PCI, the complex treatment
condition lowers ARD relative to the simple condition. Further, as expected, the effect of
complexity is stronger for respondents who have trouble identifying which side made which
argument. This suggests that complexity has a stronger effect on those who cannot resist
incoming arguments that counter their existing beliefs.
In H3, I hypothesize that higher levels of ARD – indicating more consistent reactions to
a debate’s arguments – should strengthen respondents’ attitudes. I test this by regressing
the attitude strength scale described above on ARD, along with three control variables that
should also increase attitude strength: political sophistication, a folded measure of ideology,
and a folded measure of party identification.
The results in Table 3.4 provide support for the hypothesis. The coefficient on ARD
is positive and statistically significant whether the respondents are pooled together (on the
left) or separated by study (Models 2 and 3). Further, the effect of ARD is substantively
strong. Moving from the lowest level of ARD to the highest moves respondents 20% of the
way up the attitude strength scale in the pooled model. Political sophistication behaves
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as expected by increasing attitude strength across all three models. Ideological extremity
is positive signed and significant, as expected, in two of the models. Partisan strength,
measured by the folded party identification scale, is positively signed as predicted but not
significant in two of the three models, and negatively signed and insignificant in the third
model. Notably, the correlation between the folded ideology and folded party identification
scales is high (0.63).
Table 3.4: Consistent reactions to a debate’s arguments strengthen issue attitudes.
(1) (2) (3)
Attitude Strength Attitude Strength Attitude Strength
ARD 0.20∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.23∗∗∗ (0.03)
Sophistication 0.15∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.04)
Folded Ideology 0.07∗ (0.03) 0.11∗ (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Folded Party ID 0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03)
Constant 0.30∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.02)
Study Pooled Study 1 Study 2
Within-R2 0.09 0.04 0.11
Between-R2 0.22 0.22 0.29
Overall-R2 0.16 0.17 0.18
Observations 1,132 462 670
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
Models are estimated with OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent.
All independent and dependent variables are coded 0-1.
In H4, I test an additional implication from the second hypothesis. If respondents who
can counterargue incongruent information maintain more consistent reactions to a complex
debate, and if countering incongruent arguments strengthens attitudes in the opposing di-
rection (per my discussion of the boomerang effect above), then the effect of complexity
on attitude strength should be conditional. Respondents who can resist incongruent infor-
mation should gain stronger attitudes results from complexity. Respondents who cannot
should develop weaker attitudes. I test this expectation by regressing attitude strength on
the experimental condition dummy, the PCI scale, and an interaction between the two.
Table 3.5 contains the estimated results. For a precise test of H4, I plot in Figure 3.4
the marginal effect of complexity on attitude strength across levels of PCI. The estimates
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are derived from the pooled model, which is displayed on the left side of Table 3.5. At
the lowest level of PCI, when respondents are unable to distinguish supporters’ arguments
from the arguments made by opponents, the increased volume of information conveyed in
a complex debate decreases attitude strength by 0.20 on a 0 to 1 scale. By contrast, when
respondents can fully distinguish the two sides’ arguments, complexity actually strengthens
issue attitudes, albeit modestly. These results are fully in line with H4. Further, the second
and third models in Table 3.5 separate respondents by study. The results are consistent
across all three models.
Table 3.5: The ability to counterargue incongruent political information conditions the effect of complexity on attitude strength.
(1) (2) (3)
Attitude Strength Attitude Strength Attitude Strength
Complex Condition -0.20∗∗∗ (0.05) -0.34∗∗ (0.10) -0.14∗ (0.06)
Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI) 0.05 (0.04) -0.02 (0.06) 0.09+ (0.05)
Complex × PCI 0.24∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.39∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.18∗∗ (0.06)
Constant 0.43∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.50∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.05)
Study Pooled Study 1 Study 2
Within-R2 0.02 0.04 0.01
Between-R2 0.04 0.03 0.09
Overall-R2 0.03 0.03 0.04
Observations 1,173 469 704
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
All models are estimated with OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent.
All independent and dependent variables are coded 0-1.
Marginal effects derived from the first model in Table 3.5.
Finally, H5 predicts that stronger attitudes should make respondents more willing to take
action on the issue. I test this by regressing the composite action variable described above
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on attitude strength. I also include the same control variables from Table 3.4.
Table 3.6 contains the results, which support expectations. The coefficient on attitude
strength is positive and statistically significant across all three models, which feature, respec-
tively, respondents from both studies, respondents from the first study alone, and respon-
dents from the second study alone. This suggests that willingness to act on an issue opinion
increases when an individual holds that opinion strongly. The effect is substantively large.
Compared to respondents with the weakest issue attitudes, respondents with the strongest
attitudes are on average 0.43 points higher on the willingness to act composite scale, which is
scaled from 0 to 1. Notably, the three control variables have a comparatively weak influence
on political action. All three are positively signed but largely not significant across models.
Further, with the exception of sophistication in Study 1, each of the control coefficients is
substantively small.6
Table 3.6: Stronger attitudes predict greater willingness to participate politically.
(1) (2) (3)
Action Action Action
Attitude Strength 0.43∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.04)
Sophistication 0.04 (0.03) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.08 (0.05)
Folded Ideology 0.06+ (0.03) 0.05 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Folded Party ID 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Constant 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.03)
Study Pooled Study 1 Study 2
Within-R2 0.26 0.24 0.27
Between-R2 0.18 0.22 0.22
Overall-R2 0.21 0.23 0.25
Observations 1,237 570 667
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
All models are estimated with OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent.
All independent and dependent variables are coded 0-1.
6Table 3.7 in Appendix 3B separates the action variable into its component parts and demonstrates that
the effect of attitude strength on willingness to act is positive, significant, and substantively large across four
of the five action items.
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Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have broadened our understanding of political communication in two
ways. First, I have demonstrated that political communication can affect attitude strength,
and not simply attitudes themselves. Second, I have demonstrated that the overall structure
of a debate can affect the public, over and above the effects of a debate’s specific arguments.
I present two findings in this paper. First, complex debates, in which a wide range of
arguments is presented to citizens, have nonconstant effects across the public. Citizens who
are able and motivated to resist new political information that counters their prior beliefs will
maintain consistent considerations about the issue. The consistency of their considerations
and the boomerang effect from resisting persuasion will strengthen those citizens’ existing
attitudes. Citizens who are unable or unwilling to resist new political information will have
inconsistent, conflicting considerations about the issue. Conflicting considerations, in turn,
weaken their issue attitudes.
Second, I find that attitude strength powerfully predicts political action. Further, in the
final model I present in the main text, it outpaces three other control variables that should
also predict political action by a wide margin, suggesting that attitude strength might medi-
ate the effect of political participation’s other predictors. In this paper, I have focused on one
determinant of attitude strength – the complexity of an issue debate – but its importance
to explaining political participation suggests further scholarly attention is warranted.
This paper extends the literature on citizens’ reactions to political argumentation. Some
prior work has found that competing arguments polarize issue attitudes, particularly for cit-
izens who are motivated and able to counterargue discomfiting ideas (Taber & Lodge 2006).
Other work has found that competing arguments tend to cancel out, thus leaving citizens’
attitudes unchanged (Sniderman & Theriault 2004, Chong & Druckman 2007). In this study,
I test a different phenomenon – variation in the volume of arguments and not the balance
of arguments – and consequently reach a different conclusion: an increased volume of in-
formation can either weaken or strengthen citizens’ issue attitudes, depending on citizens’
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motivated reasoning capacities. Since attitude strength affects participation, my findings
also underscore an additional consequence of elite communication researchers often ignore.
Finally, the existing literature on issue characteristics often assumes that there are partic-
ular, stable categorizations of political issues that are inherently different from one another.
Some issues – like hard issues in Carmines and Stimson’s well known categorization (1980)
or consensus issues in Patrick Egan’s schema (2013) – are seen as more complex than others.
The implication is that complex issues invite less citizen participation than simpler ones.
The expectations from my own theory are more nuanced. Complex and simple presenta-
tions of all issues should affect the strength with which issue attitudes are held – and thus,
the likelihood of taking action on the issue. Even if attitudes on easy issues are stronger
than attitudes on hard issues, attitudes on easy issues themselves will be held with greater
or less strength depending on the presentation of the issue and the ability of individuals to
process incoming political information.
Normatively, my results provide cause for concern. Democratic theorists often look to
elites to provide the mass public with tools to more effectively engage the political system.
By defining issues in terms that citizens can understand, elite debate is supposed to clarify
what is at stake in policy disputes so that citizens can more easily determine their issue posi-
tions and advocate for their stances. In this way, elites facilitate broader citizen engagement.
As I write elsewhere, though, policy debates tend to become complex due to the efforts
of reform opponents (2016). Further, I establish above that complex debates stratify citizens
according to their ability to process political information. We should therefore worry that
the citizens most likely to participate in reform efforts are unrepresentative of the broader
population. This is because the citizens most capable of processing new political information
(and thus most likely to gain stronger attitudes from complex debates) are likely to be issue
activists, ideologues, and extreme partisans. To the extent that their views differ from the
views of the wider public (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 2006), the downstream effect of complex
debates is to strengthen the voices of the most extreme citizens in the policy reform process.
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APPENDIX 1A: TEXT REPRESENTATION SELECTION
In the absence of best practices for selecting the number of topics, a data-driven
approach was adopted by estimating the model repeatedly, varying the number of topics
between 10 and 80 to determine which version provides the most coherent and sensible
topics. Further, a variety of representations of each document were tested by varying which
terms were included when estimating the topic model. This was accomplished by reducing
the included terms according to their average term frequency-inverse document frequency
(tf-idf) scores. Tf-idf scores weight each term in each document by its frequency in the
document and apply a penalty for terms that appear frequently in other documents in the
same collection. The highest scores are thus applied to a term in a document that appears
repeatedly in that document but only appears in five other documents (reflecting the rare
term threshold referenced in the main text). High scores for a term in a document represent
language that’s highly characteristic of that particular document. By extension, taking the
average tf-idf score for each term across all documents should distinguish the terms that
are of greater substantive interest from the rest. Tf-idf scores were incorporated in the text
representation in three ways: by only including terms that have an average tf-idf score above
the average tf-idf score of the full collection; by only including terms that have an average
tf-idf score above the 90th percentile; and by only including terms that have an average tf-idf
score above the 95th percentile.
Further, the baseline unigram model, where each term is treated as a separate feature
of the text, is a bag-of-words approach to topic modeling in which the order of the terms
and where they appear in the document are ignored. Because term order potentially has
substantive meaning in this debate – in phrases like “preexisting condition” and “status
quo,” for example – topic models were also estimated with the text represented with both
unigrams and bigrams.
To select the best fitting model among the various combinations of topic numbers and
text representations, I read through the FREX vocabulary (defined in the main text) for each
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of the topics produced by the model, attempting to provide a substantive interpretation to
each topic and a judgment about the topic’s quality. Each estimated topic was assigned a
score of poor, medium, or high based on how clear the identity of a topic is from its FREX
vocabulary. Better-fitting topic models have a relatively higher proportion of topics rated
as high or medium.
This procedure was performed after estimating 40-topic models for each of the seven
text representations – full unigram, unigram above the mean tf-idf, unigram above the
90th percentile tf-idf score, unigram above the 95th percentile tf-idf score, unigram and
bigram above the mean tf-idf, unigram and bigram above the 90th percentile tf-idf score,
and unigram and bigram above the 95th percentile tf-idf score. The results of this exercise
indicated that the two most promising text representations were the full unigram model and
unigrams above the 90th percentile tf-idf score. Because the full unigram text representation
involves the least amount of data manipulation, I report results from this representation
exclusively in the main text and appendices of the paper. Further, 40 topics produced the
highest proportion of sensible topics, and thus the main text relies exclusively on that format.
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APPENDIX 1B: ADDITIONAL TABLES and FIGURES
Table A1.3: Complexity and Proportion of Top Topic by Party and Time (Figures 1.2 and 1.4)
(1) (2)
Complexity Top Proportion
Democratic Party -0.16∗∗ (0.04) 0.14∗∗ (0.03)
Days Since February 3, 2009 -0.08∗ (0.04) 0.07∗ (0.04)
Democratic Party × Days 0.09 (0.06) -0.08 (0.05)
Constant 0.52∗∗ (0.03) 0.58∗∗ (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.04
Observations 1,120 1,120
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
The dependent variable on the left is the Shannon’s diversity index score of each speech calculated from the 12 overarching
topics referenced in Table 1.2. On the right, the dependent variable is the proportion of each speech devoted to its top topic.
All variables are scaled 0-1. Both models are estimated with OLS.
Table A1.4: Effect of Party on Attention to Topics (Figure 1.5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Problems Goals Process Big Government Cuts Business Partisanship
Democratic Party 0.36∗∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗ (0.01) -0.13∗∗ (0.01) -0.12∗∗ (0.01) -0.18∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.07∗∗ (0.01)
Constant 0.08∗∗ (0.01) 0.13∗∗ (0.01) 0.15∗∗ (0.01) 0.15∗∗ (0.01) 0.19∗∗ (0.01) 0.03∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗ (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.03
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Each dependent variable represents a different clustered topic and is scaled from 0 to 1 based on the proportion of a speech
devoted to that topic. The linear regression model is estimated with OLS.
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Table A1.5: Effect of Party on Complexity Across Topic Models (Unclustered)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10 Topics 15 Topics 20 Topics 40 Topics 60 Topics 80 Topics
Democratic Party 0.03∗ (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.05∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗∗ (0.01) -0.02+ (0.01)
Constant 0.58∗∗ (0.01) 0.56∗∗ (0.01) 0.55∗∗ (0.01) 0.47∗∗ (0.01) 0.42∗∗ (0.01) 0.34∗∗ (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
The dependent variables are the Shannon’s diversity index scores calculated from the estimated topics of six different topic
models. The index scores are scaled 0-1, and the models are estimated with OLS.
Table A1.6: Effect of Party and Time on Complexity Across Topic Models (Unclustered)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10 Topics 15 Topics 20 Topics 40 Topics 60 Topics 80 Topics
Democratic Party -0.09∗ (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) -0.08∗ (0.04) -0.08∗ (0.04) -0.06 (0.04)
Days Since February 3, 2009 -0.11∗∗ (0.04) -0.06+ (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04)
Democratic Party × Days 0.19∗∗ (0.05) 0.09+ (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
Constant 0.65∗∗ (0.02) 0.60∗∗ (0.02) 0.56∗∗ (0.03) 0.48∗∗ (0.03) 0.40∗∗ (0.03) 0.36∗∗ (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
The dependent variables are the Shannon’s diversity index scores calculated from the estimated topics of six different topic
models. The index scores are scaled 0-1, and the models are estimated with OLS.
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These figures are derived from the linear regression models in Table 1.6 above. The y-axis is predicted Shannon’s H Index
scores, where higher values indicate greater complexity.
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APPENDIX 2A: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table A2.7: Ideology is more predictive of vote choice on ideological measures when goals are clear (corresponding to Figure
2.1).
(1) (2)
Liberal Reforms Conservative Reforms
Goal Clarity 2.34∗∗ (0.26) -1.90∗∗ (0.39)
Ideology -0.61 (0.42) 0.51 (0.44)
Goal Clarity × Ideology -1.89∗∗ (0.45) 2.23∗∗ (0.55)
Hard Issue -0.76∗∗ (0.07) -0.96∗∗ (0.16)
Readability -2.07∗∗ (0.22) 3.18∗∗ (0.69)
Word Count -0.24 (0.21) 6.67∗∗ (0.61)
Sophistication -0.88∗∗ (0.22) -0.18 (0.35)
Level of Information 0.13 (0.10) 0.31+ (0.17)
Constant 0.35 (0.31) -3.19∗∗ (0.61)
State Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Observations 7,847 5,092
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Logit with weights and random effects for individual respondents. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted
in favor of the measure and 0 if she voted against. Clarity of goals can take on values of 0, 0.5, or 1, where 1 indicates that
the goals of the ballot measure are very clear. On the left are measures that move policy in a liberal direction; on the right,
measures move policy in a conservative direction. Only respondents who voted in the 2012 general election and voted on the
measure are included in these models.
Table A2.8: Respondents are more likely to vote on all measures and support non-ideological measures as their goals become
clearer. (Student-coded goal clarity scores.)
(1) (2)
Vote Support
Goal Clarity 0.86∗∗ (0.13) 1.07∗∗ (0.08)
Hard Issue -0.33∗∗ (0.10) 0.28∗∗ (0.09)
Liberal Reforms 0.48∗∗ (0.10)
Conservative Reforms 0.11 (0.09)
Ideology 0.97∗∗ (0.34) -0.38∗∗ (0.14)
Readability -0.65∗ (0.33) 0.27 (0.25)
Word Count 0.85∗∗ (0.23) -1.71∗∗ (0.17)
Sophistication 5.44∗∗ (0.55) -0.42+ (0.24)
Level of Information 3.62∗∗ (0.18) 0.17 (0.11)
Constant 2.44∗∗ (0.64) 3.28∗∗ (0.36)
State Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Observations 25,666 10,377
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Both models are logit with weights and random effects for individual respondents. The dependent variable in the first model
is coded 1 if the respondent voted on the measure and 0 if she did not. The dependent variable in the second model is coded
1 if the respondent voted in favor of the measure and 0 if she voted against. All variables are coded 0-1. In the second model,
only non-ideological ballot measures are included. Clarity of goals can take on values of 0, 0.5, or 1, where 1 indicates that the
goals of the ballot measure are very clear. Only respondents who voted in the 2012 general election and voted on the measure
are included in these models. These models rely on the student coding of goal clarity.
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Each figure is derived from a logit model with weights and random effects for respondents where the dependent variable is 1 if
the respondent voted in favor of a measure and 0 if she voted against. These figures rely on the student coding of the ballot
measures’ goal clarity. On the left, the measures push policy in a liberal direction. On the right, the measures push policy
in a conservative direction. The marginal effect is the change in probability of voting in favor of the measure as a respondent
moves from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, and as the clarity of the goals moves from unclear (0) to clear (1). The
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. A -.5 marginal effect indicates, for example, that the probability of voting in favor of
reform has dropped by 50 percentage points. The same set of controls included in the models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are included
here, with continuous variables set at their mean, the hard issue dummy set at 1 (indicating a hard issues), and the state set
as California. Only respondents who voted in the 2012 general election and voted on the ballot measure are included in these
models.
Table A2.9: Clear goals make ideological measures seem more ideologically extreme, partisan, and relevant to social groups.
(Student-coded goal clarity scores.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extremity Partisanship Group Named Affective Group Reaction
Goal Clarity 0.59∗∗ (0.13) 1.02∗∗ (0.12) 0.60∗∗ (0.11) 0.26+ (0.15)
Hard Issue -0.02 (0.07) -0.44∗∗ (0.06) -0.37∗∗ (0.06) -0.58∗∗ (0.08)
Conservative Reform -0.53∗∗ (0.07) 0.37∗∗ (0.07) -0.76∗∗ (0.07) 0.15 (0.09)
Ideology 0.47∗ (0.22) 0.30 (0.22) -0.20 (0.21) 0.59∗∗ (0.20)
Readability -0.15 (0.27) -0.19 (0.24) -1.28∗∗ (0.23) -1.07∗∗ (0.28)
Word Count 0.08 (0.21) -0.74∗∗ (0.20) 1.30∗∗ (0.20) 0.42+ (0.24)
Sophistication 4.50∗∗ (0.46) 3.45∗∗ (0.36) 4.62∗∗ (0.35) 1.38∗∗ (0.35)
Level of Information 1.52∗∗ (0.14) 0.70∗∗ (0.12) 0.80∗∗ (0.11) 0.70∗∗ (0.13)
Constant -2.00∗∗ (0.35) -1.46∗∗ (0.34) -0.51 (0.35)
State Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,068 14,258 14,258 8,816
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
The dependent variables across the four models are, respectively: perceived ideological extremity of the measure (coded 0-3);
whether or not the respondent thought at least one party campaigned in favor or against the measure; whether or not a specific
affected group could be named; and whether or not respondents had an emotional reaction to the group they named. All
independent variables are coded 0-1. Clarity of goals can take on values of 0, 0.5, or 1, where 1 indicates that the goals of the
ballot measure are very clear. These models rely on the student-coded goal clarity scores. Model 1 is ordered logit with clustered
standard errors, weights, and random effects for individual respondents, and models 2-4 are logit with weights and random
effects for individual respondents. These models include ballot measures that moved policy in either a liberal or conservative
direction. Only respondents who voted in the 2012 general election are included.
89
Table A2.10: Models Corresponding to Figure A2.2 (Student-coded goal clarity scores.)
(1) (2)
Liberal Reforms Conservative Reforms
Goal Clarity 5.18∗∗ (0.36) 2.51∗∗ (0.42)
Ideology 4.28∗∗ (0.49) 0.71 (0.43)
Goal Clarity × Ideology -7.42∗∗ (0.54) 2.22∗∗ (0.55)
Hard Issue -0.80∗∗ (0.08) 1.29∗∗ (0.19)
Readability -2.86∗∗ (0.29) 10.04∗∗ (0.85)
Word Count 0.69∗∗ (0.21) 5.26∗∗ (0.63)
Sophistication -0.83∗∗ (0.22) -0.16 (0.37)
Level of Information 0.06 (0.10) -0.00 (0.18)
Constant -2.06∗∗ (0.36) -10.01∗∗ (0.69)
State Dummy Variables Yes Yes
Observations 7,847 5,092
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Logit with weights and random effects for individual respondents. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted
in favor of the measure and 0 if she voted against. Clarity of goals can take on values of 0, 0.5, or 1, where 1 indicates that
the goals of the ballot measure are very clear. These models are based on the student-coded goal clarity scores. On the left
are measures that move policy in a liberal direction; on the right, measures move policy in a conservative direction. Only
respondents who voted in the 2012 general election and voted on the measure are included in these models.
Table A2.11: Correlations of three perceived clarity measures (Study 2).
Perceived... Goal Clarity Problem Clarity Policy Change Clarity
Goal Clarity 1.00
Problem Clarity 0.66 1.00
Policy Change Clarity 0.68 0.54 1.00
Table A2.12: VIF Scores and Tolerances of three perceived clarity measures (Study 2).
VIF Tolerance
Perceived Goal Clarity 2.38 0.42
Perceived Problem Clarity 1.80 0.55
Perceived Policy Change Clarity 1.91 0.52
VIF scores only include observations where political sophistication, attitude strength, and perceived complexity are non-missing
in order to correspond to the two models in Table 2.6.
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Table A2.13: Clear goals treatment condition increased perceived goal and problem clarity in both topics (Study 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goal Clarity Goal Clarity Problem Clarity Problem Clarity
Treatment Condition 0.08∗ (0.03) 0.08∗ (0.02) 0.10∗ (0.03) 0.11∗ (0.03)
Constant 0.46∗ (0.02) 0.55∗ (0.02) 0.46∗ (0.02) 0.45∗ (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Observations 366 367 366 365
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
All models are OLS with dependent variables scaled 0-1. From left to right, the dependent variables are perceived goal clarity,
perceived goal clarity, perceived problem clarity, and perceived problem clarity.
Figures correspond to the model in Table 2.11 below, which relies on Study 2. The y-axis is the predicted probability of seeing
the ballot proposal as partisan. The treatment condition makes respondents more likely to see the debt limit proposal as
partisan and less likely to see the job creation proposal as partisan.
Table A2.14: Model corresponding to Figure A2.3.
(1)
Perceived Partisanship
Treatment Condition 0.55∗ (0.25)
Jobs Creation Topic Dummy 1.06∗ (0.27)
Treatment × Jobs Dummy -1.31∗ (0.38)
Constant 0.57∗ (0.18)
Observations 733
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
Logistic regression with random effects for respondents. The dependent variable is whether the respondent thought the ballot
proposal was partisan. The jobs creation topic dummy is 1 when the proposal is about jobs creation and 0 when it is about the
debt limit.
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Figures correspond to the two models in Table A2.12, which relies on Study 2. The y-axis is the predicted probability of seeing
the ballot proposal as endorsed by Republicans. The x-axis is level of political sophistication. The treatment condition makes
respondents increasingly unlikely to think the jobs creation proposal is Republican as political sophistication increases.
Table A2.15: Models corresponding to Figure A2.4.
(1) (2)
Republican Proposal Republican Proposal
Treatment Condition 0.77 (0.50) 0.03 (0.53)
Sophistication 1.61 (0.83) 1.56 (0.95)
Treatment × Sophistication -0.24 (1.13) -2.19 (1.26)
Constant -0.97∗ (0.37) 0.72 (0.39)
Proposal Debt Limit Job Creation
Observations 360 359
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
Both models are logistic regression. The dependent variable is whether the respondent thought the Republican Party endorsed
the ballot proposal. The treatment condition dummy variable and sophistication are both coded 0-1.
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APPENDIX 2B: LIST OF PROPOSALS (STUDY 2)
Respondents were randomly shown two proposals from the list of 14 below. The first seven
(Proposals 3-9) have relatively clear goals, while the rest (Proposals 10-16) have relatively
unclear goals.
1. Proposal 3 authorizes a temporary one-half cent sales and use tax to fund state high-
ways, bridges, county and city roads, and other surface transportation with state rev-
enues securing four-lane highway construction and improvement bonds.
2. Proposal 4 would allow for property tax discounts for disabled veterans. It explicitly
extends the rights to ad valorem tax discounts, made available in 2014 to all veterans
who were residents of the state prior to their service, to all combat-disabled veterans
currently living in the state whether they were residents prior to their service or not.
3. Proposal 5, the Renewable Energy Amendment, would require utilities to obtain at
least 25% of their electricity from clean renewable energy sources, which are wind,
solar, biomass, and hydropower, by 2025.
4. Proposal 6 would make it a class C felony to maliciously and intentionally harm a
living dog, cat, or horse. It would not apply to production agriculture, or to lawful
activities of hunters and trappers, licensed veterinarians, scientific researchers, or to
individuals engaged in lawful defense of life or property.
5. Proposal 7 establishes the Large Project Development Fund. Beginning January 1,
2019, 22% of contractors’ excise tax revenues would be transferred from the state
general fund to the Large Project Development Fund. The State Board of Economic
Development would use Large Project Development Fund monies to provide grants for
the construction of large economic development projects within the state.
6. Proposal 8 prohibits public dollars from funding abortions. It would prohibit the State
Constitution from being interpreted to create broader rights than those contained in
the US Constitution. It exempts federal law requirements, physician-certified physical
danger to the mother, and instances of rape or incest.
7. Proposal 9 would establish a teacher scholarship program; create a program for math
and science teacher bonuses; create a program for teacher merit bonuses; mandate a
uniform teacher and principal evaluation system; and eliminate state requirements for
teacher tenure.
8. Proposal 10 would set the amount exempt from annual property taxes on business
equipment and machinery purchased after 2016 to an amount equal to the combined
earnings of 50 workers.
9. Proposal 11 removes restrictions on the state legislature’s authority to enact laws re-
garding corporations. It allows the state legislature to: (1) authorize alternative meth-
ods of voting in elections for corporate directors; (2) expand the types of contributions
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a corporation may receive for the issuance of stock or bonds; and (3) establish proce-
dures governing the increase of corporate stock or debt.
10. Proposal 12 changes commercial non-tribal fishing in the state’s inland waters by ban-
ning gillnets and adopting other regulatory changes; recreational fishers are ensured
their share.
11. Proposal 13 increases the term length and raises the retirement age for justices and
judges; modifies membership of court appointment commissions; requires publishing
court decisions online and transmitting a copy of judicial performance reviews of each
judge up for retention to the state legislature.
12. Proposal 14 sets a limit on the annual percentage increase in property values used to
determine property taxes to no more than 5% above the previous year, and establishes
a single limited property value as the basis for determining all property taxes on real
property, beginning in 2020.
13. Proposal 15 requires manufacturers to label food sold to consumers that is made from
plants or animals with genetic material changed in specific ways. It prohibits marketing
such food, or other processed food, as natural and provides exemptions.
14. Proposal 16 would prohibit increases in the assessed value of homestead property if the
fair market value of the property decreases; reduces the limitation on annual assessment
increases to non-homestead property; and provides an additional homestead exemption.
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APPENDIX 3A: ISSUE ARGUMENTS
Minimum Wage Arguments
Supporters
• Poverty levels are at an all-time high in the state.
• Well paid employees spend money on local businesses.
• Low-income families would benefit enormously from this proposal.
• Recent polling indicates that a majority of people in this state support the bill.
• People deserve to be paid fairly for their work. No one who works full time should be
in poverty.
• Previous increases in the minimum wage have produced higher average incomes without
an increase in unemployment.
• High poverty rates burden the state’s social welfare services.
• The big corporations in the state are the ones opposing this bill.
Opponents
• This proposal is too costly to businesses.
• The biggest cause of poverty in the state is the skyrocketing cost of housing. Raising
the minimum wage won’t address that.
• People are trying to ram this through without any opportunity for debate.
• Labor unions are the bill’s biggest supporters because they can charge their members
increased dues.
• This is just another example of government overreach into private enterprise.
• This kind of decision should be made at the local level, since city councils can set the
right minimum wage better than a state government can.
• Raising the minimum wage by nearly $5 is too radical. We should try raising it by a
smaller amount to see what the effects will be.
• This bill is a distraction from bigger issues, like underfunded schools.
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Cell Phone Data Arguments
Supporters
• The threat of domestic terrorism is rising.
• Other countries are taking similar steps to combat domestic terrorism. We need to
keep pace with our allies.
• The public expects us to take action to keep them safe, instead of just talking and
debating about it forever.
• We’re only talking about minor increases in data surveillance. This is what cell phone
companies already have access to.
• Everyone has the right to feel safe and secure in their own country.
• The executive branch is constitutionally obligated to protect us. We need to empower
it to do so.
• There will be limited access to this data and strict oversight over its usage.
• Victims of domestic terrorism shouldn’t die in vain.
Opponents
• Terrorists rarely use cell phones when planning their attacks, so giving the government
more access to cell phone data won’t make us safer.
• The bill creates a slippery slope where the federal government can access any data it
wants for any purpose.
• The other side wrote the entire bill on their own, without giving us a chance to provide
input.
• It’s inevitable that this data access will be abused and used for other purposes.
• The number of domestic terrorist acts hasn’t actually changed over the past decade.
We shouldn’t make major changes like this when there isn’t a new problem.
• This kind of invasion of privacy is unconstitutional.
• Recent protests in Washington show the public’s opposition to this bill.
• Ethnic minorities will be unduly targeted under this proposal.
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Charter School Arguments
Supporters
• Traditional public schools are failing to prepare students for the workplace and higher
education.
• Charter school teachers have the flexibility to tailor the curriculum to the individual
needs of their students.
• Parents deserve choices over where they send their children to school.
• It’ll be easier to fix this problem now than kicking it further down the road until it
gets worse.
• The teachers’ unions oppose this bill because they will lose power.
• Expanding the number of charter schools is an excellent recruiting tool for the best
new teachers to come work in the state.
• This bill builds on the demonstrated success of the state’s existing charter schools.
• More charter schools means less bureaucratic control over what teachers can do in their
classrooms.
Opponents
• This proposal would take money that should be devoted to improving traditional public
schools for all children.
• Most North Carolinians oppose passage of this bill.
• It’s a handful of well connected parents who are pushing this bill because it will benefit
their families the most.
• It’s hasty to double the number of charter schools when researchers are still unsure
about their effectiveness.
• Bringing together all different kinds of students into the same classroom is a core
purpose of public education. This is impossible when parents pick and choose where
their children go.
• The massive investment this would require is unwise in uncertain economic times like
these.
• Instability in students’ home lives is the real cause of poor student performance. Char-
ter schools will do nothing to solve that.
• Separating students into charter schools and traditional public schools will only widen
existing educational disparities.
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Wind Energy Arguments
Supporters
• The U.S. is too reliant on non-renewable fossil fuels.
• Using more wind power will help address climate change.
• These funds for research and development will spur additional discoveries in science
and technology, helping keep America globally competitive.
• The public is demanding we take action to address the energy crisis.
• The oil companies have damaged the environment for too long. We must not continue
to reward them for their bad behavior.
• We need to try all approaches to address the many environmental crises we face. We
cannot afford to leave any idea on the table.
• Future generations will thank us for making a responsible investment of our resources
today.
• It has long been federal policy to steer money toward research projects aimed at the
public’s benefit.
Opponents
• This bill was written and promoted by environmental lobbyists.
• Most energy experts oppose passage of this bill.
• Even when fully developed, wind power wouldn’t make a dent in the United States’
overall energy usage. It’s at best a minor fix.
• Wind power is unproven on a large scale.
• Energy production is best handled by the private marketplace. It’s not the federal
government’s place to push these kinds of innovations.
• Singling out wind power companies for special treatment harms workers who are em-
ployed in other energy fields.
• We should be investing our resources in more pressing threats, like foreign terrorism.
• It’s inevitable that these funds will only be granted to the well-connected firms who
can hire special lobbyists.
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APPENDIX 3B: ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table A3.7: The effect of attitude strength on action is robust across four of the five action items.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Donate Volunteer Petition Share Opinion Change Vote
Attitude Strength 0.42∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.48∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.06 (0.06)
Political Sophistication 0.01 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.06) 0.17∗ (0.07) 0.03 (0.07)
Folded Party ID 0.07∗ (0.03) 0.09∗∗ (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04)
Constant -0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 0.14∗∗ (0.04) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.04)
Within-R2 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.31 0.00
Between-R2 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.29 0.02
Overall-R2 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.01
Study Both Both Study 1 Study 2 Study 2
Observations 1,248 1,246 570 677 678
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All models are OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent. All independent
and dependent variables are coded 0-1.
Table A3.8: Replication of Table 3.2 accounting for heteroskedasticity.
(1)
ARD
Complex Condition -0.32∗∗∗ (0.08)
Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI) 0.07 (0.07)
Complexity × PCI 0.24∗∗ (0.09)
Constant 0.28∗∗∗ (0.07)
Variance
Complex Condition -0.89∗∗∗ (0.08)
Constant -2.18∗∗∗ (0.05)
Observations 1,182
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
Heteroskedastic linear regression model with standard errors clustered by respondent.
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Table A3.9: Replication of Table 3.3 with studies separated out.
(1) (2)
ARD ARD
Complex Condition -0.31∗ (0.14) -0.31∗∗ (0.10)
Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI) 0.07 (0.12) 0.08 (0.09)
Complexity × PCI 0.22 (0.15) 0.24∗ (0.11)
Constant 0.28∗ (0.12) 0.28∗∗ (0.09)
Study Study 1 Study 2
Within-R2 0.07 0.05
Between-R2 0.04 0.02
Overall-R2 0.05 0.04
Observations 472 710
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
Both models are OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent. All inde-
pendent and dependent variables are coded 0-1.
Table A3.10: Sophistication conditions the effect of PCI on ARD.
(1) (2) (3)
ARD ARD ARD
Sophistication -0.41 (0.26) -0.38 (0.52) -0.72∗ (0.31)
Proportion Correctly Identified (PCI) -0.09 (0.14) -0.23 (0.35) -0.16 (0.15)
Sophistication × PCI 0.57∗ (0.28) 0.61 (0.54) 0.90∗∗ (0.34)
Constant 0.32∗ (0.13) 0.38 (0.33) 0.40∗∗ (0.14)
Study Pooled Study 1 Study 2
Within-R2 0.01 0.00 0.01
Between-R2 0.05 0.06 0.09
Overall-R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 1,162 468 694
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
OLS with random effects for individual respondents and standard errors clustered by respondent. All independent and dependent
variables are coded 0-1.
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